Chapter II. considers the sense of Justice, Remorse, and the feeling of Merit.

Every man is recommended by nature to his own care, being fitter to take care of himself than of another person.  We approve, therefore, of each one seeking their own good; but then it must not be to the hurt of any other being.  The primary feeling of self-preservation would not of itself, however, be shocked at causing injury to our fellows.  It is when we pass out of this point of view, and enter into the mental state of the spectator of our actions, that we feel the sense of injustice and the sting of Remorse.  Though it may be true that every individual in his own breast prefers himself to mankind, yet he dares not look mankind in the face, and avow that he acts on this principle.  A man is approved when he outstrips his fellows in a fair race; he is condemned when he jostles or trips up a competitor unfairly.  The actor takes home to himself this feeling; a feeling known as Shame, Dread of Punishment, and Remorse.

So with the obverse.  He that performs a generous action can realize the sentiments of the by-stander, and applaud himself by sympathy with the approbation of the supposed impartial judge.  This is the sense of Merit.

Chapter III. gives reflections upon the utility of this constitution of our nature.  Human beings are dependent upon one another for mutual assistance, and are exposed to mutual injuries.  Society might exist without love or beneficence, but not without mutual abstinence from injury.  Beneficence is the ornament that embellishes the building; Justice the main pillar that supports it.  It is for the observance of Justice that we need that consciousness of ill-desert, and those terrors of mental punishment, growing out of our sympathy with the disapprobation of our fellows.  Justice is necessary to the existence of society, and we often defend its dictates on that ground; but, without looking to such a remote and comprehensive end, we are plunged into remorse for its violation by the shorter process of referring to the censure of a supposed spectator [in other words, to the sanction of public opinion].

Section III.—­Of the influence of Fortune upon the sentiments of mankind, with regard to the Merit and the Demerit of actions.

Every voluntary action consists of three parts:—­(1) the Intention or motive, (2) the Mechanism, as when we lift the hand, and give a blow, and (3) the Consequences.  It is, in principle, admitted by all, that only the first, the Intention, can be the subject of blame.  The Mechanism is in itself indifferent.  So the Consequences cannot be properly imputed to the agent, unless intended by him.  On this last point, however, mankind do not always adhere to their general maxim; when they come to particular cases, they are influenced, in their estimate of merit and demerit, by the actual consequences of the action.