Chapter II. determines the proper objects of Gratitude and Resentment, these being also the proper objects of Reward and Punishment respectively.  ’These, as well as all the other passions of human nature, seem proper, and are approved of, when the heart of every impartial spectator entirely sympathizes with them, when every indifferent by-stander entirely enters into, and goes along with them.’  In short, a good moral decision is obtained by the unanimous vote of all impartial persons.

This view is in accordance with the course taken by the mind in the two contrasting situations.  In sympathizing with the joy of a prosperous person, we approve of his complacent and grateful sentiment towards the author of his prosperity; we make his gratitude our own:  in sympathizing with sorrow, we enter into, and approve of, the natural resentment towards the agent causing it.

Chapter III. remarks that where we do not approve of the conduct of the person conferring the benefit, we have little sympathy with the gratitude of the receiver; we do not care to enter into the gratitude of the favourites of profligate monarchs.

Chapter IV. supposes the case of our approving strongly the conduct and the motives of a benefactor, in which case we sympathize to a corresponding degree with the gratitude of the receiver.

Chapter V. sums up the analysis of the Sense of Merit and of Demerit thus:—­The sense of Merit is a compound sentiment, made up of two distinct emotions; a direct sympathy with the sentiments of the agent (constituting the propriety of the action), and an indirect sympathy with the gratitude of the recipient.  The sense of Demerit includes a direct antipathy to the sentiments of the agent, and an indirect sympathy with the resentment of the sufferer.

Section II. is Of Justice and Beneficence.

Chapter I. compares the two virtues.  Actions of a beneficent tendency, from proper motives, seem alone to require a reward; actions of a hurtful tendency, from improper motives, seem alone to deserve punishment.  It is the nature of Beneficence to be free; the mere absence of it does not expose to punishment.  Of all the duties of beneficence, the one most allied to perfect obligation is gratitude; but although we talk of the debt of gratitude (we do not say the debt of charity), we do not punish ingratitude.

Resentment, the source of punishment, is given for defence against positive evil; we employ it not to extort benefits, but to repel injuries.  Now, the injury is the violation of Justice.  The sense of mankind goes along with the employment of violence to avenge the hurt done by injustice, to prevent the injury, and to restrain the offender.  Beneficence, then, is the subject of reward; and the want of it is not the subject of punishment.  There may be cases where a beneficent act is compelled by punishment, as in obliging a father to support his family, or in punishing a man for not interfering when another is in danger; but these cases are immaterial exceptions to the broad definition.  He might have added, that in cases where justice is performed under unusual difficulties, and with unusual fidelity, our disposition would be not merely to exempt from punishment, but to reward.