Chapter III. is on the Unsocial Passions.  These necessarily divide our sympathy between him that feels them and him that is their object.  Resentment is especially hard to sympathize with.  We may ourselves resent wrong done to another, but the less so that the sufferer strongly resents it.  Moreover, there is in the passion itself an element of the disagreeable and repulsive; its manifestation is naturally distasteful.  It may be useful and even necessary, but so is a prison, which is not on that account a pleasant object.  In order to make its gratification agreeable, there must be many well known conditions and qualifications attending it.

Chapter IV. gives the contrast of the Social Passions.  It is with the humane, the benevolent sentiments, that our sympathy is unrestricted and complete.  Even in their excess, they never inspire aversion.

Chapter V. is on the Selfish Passions.  He supposes these, in regard to sympathy, to hold a middle place between the social and the unsocial.  We sympathize with small joys and with great sorrows; and not with great joys (which dispense with our aid, if they do not excite our envy) or with small troubles.

Section III. considers the effects of prosperity and adversity upon the judgments of mankind regarding propriety of action.

Chapter I. puts forward the proposition that our sympathy with sorrow, although more lively than our sympathy with joy, falls short of the intensity of feeling in the person concerned.  It is agreeable to sympathize with joy, and we do so with the heart; the painfulness of entering into grief and misery holds us back.  Hence, as he remarked before, the magnanimity and nobleness of the man that represses his woes, and does not exact our compassionate participation.

Chapter II. inquires into the origin of Ambition, and of the distinction of Ranks.  Proceeding upon the principle just enounced, that mankind sympathize with joy rather than with sorrow, the author composes an exceedingly eloquent homily on the worship paid to rank and greatness.

Chapter III., in continuation of the same theme, illustrates the corruption of our moral sentiments, arising from this worship of the great.  ’We frequently see the respectful attentions of the world more strongly directed towards the rich and the great, than towards the wise and the virtuous.’  ’The external graces, the frivolous accomplishments of that impertinent and foolish thing called a man of fashion, are commonly more admired than the solid and masculine virtues of a warrior, a statesman, a philosopher, or a legislator.’

PART II. is OF MERIT AND DEMERIT; OR OF THE OBJECTS OF REWARD AND PUNISHMENT.  It consists of three Sections.

Section I. is, Of the Sense of Merit and Demerit.

Chapter I. maintains that whatever appears to be the proper object of gratitude, appears to deserve reward; and that whatever appears to be the proper object of resentment, appears to deserve punishment.  The author distinguishes between gratitude and mere love or liking; and, obversely, between resentment and hatred.  Love makes us pleased to see any one promoted; but gratitude urges us to be ourselves the instrument of their promotion.