Chapter III. relates to the origin of our Desires and Affections, by which he means more especially Self-love and Benevolence.  His position here is that Self-love is the essence of a Sensible being, Benevolence the essential of an Intelligent being.  By the very nature of our sensitive constitution, we cannot but choose happiness for self; and it is only an act of intellectual consistency to extend the same measure to others.  The same qualification, however, is made as to the insufficiency of a mere intellectual impulse in this matter, without constitutional tendencies.  These constitutional tendencies the author considers as made up of our Appetites and Passions, while our Affections are founded on our rational nature.  Then follow a few observations in confirmation of Butler’s views as to the disinterested nature of our affections.

Chapter IV. is on our Ideas of good and ill Desert.  These are only a variety of our ideas of right and wrong, being the feelings excited towards the moral Agent.  Our reason determines, with regard to a virtuous agent, that he ought to be the better for his virtue.  The ground of such determination, however, is not solely that virtuous conduct promotes the happiness of mankind, and vice detracts from it; this counts for much, but not for all.  Virtue is in itself rewardable; vice is of essential demerit.  Our understanding recognizes the absolute and eternal rectitude, the intrinsic fitness of the procedure in both aspects.

Chapter V. is entitled ’Of the Reference of Morality to the Divine Nature; the Rectitude of our Faculties; and the Grounds of Belief.’  The author means to reply to the objection that his system, in setting up a criterion independent of God, is derogatory to the Divine nature.  He urges that there must be attributes of the Deity, independent of his will; as his Existence, Immensity, Power, Wisdom; that Mind supposes Truth apart from itself; that without moral distinctions there could be no Moral Attributes in the Deity.  Certain things are inherent in his Nature, and not dependent on his will.  There is a limit to the universe itself; two infinities of space or of duration are not possible.  The necessary goodness of the divine nature is a part of necessary truth.  Thus, morality, although not asserted to depend on the will of the Deity, is still resolvable into his nature.  In all this, Price avowedly follows Cudworth.

He then starts another difficulty.  May not our faculties be mistaken, or be so constituted as to deceive us?  To which he gives the reply, made familiar to us by Hamilton, that the doubt is suicidal; the faculty that doubts being itself under the same imputation.  Nay, more, a being cannot be made such as to be imposed on by falsehood; what is false is nothing.  As to the cases of actual mistake, these refer to matters attended with some difficulty; and it does not follow that we must be mistaken in cases that are clear.

He concludes with a statement of the ultimate grounds of our belief.  These are, (1) Consciousness or Feeling, as in regard to our own existence, our sensations, passions, &c.; (2) Intuition, comprising self-evident truths; and (3) Deduction, or Argumentation.  He discusses under these the existence of a material world, and affirms that we have an Intuition that it is possible.