Appendix IV. is on some VERBAL DISPUTES.  He remarks that, neither in English nor in any other modern tongue, is the boundary fixed between virtues and talents, vices and defects; that praise is given to natural endowments, as well as to voluntary exertions.  The epithets intellectual and moral do not precisely divide the virtues; neither does the contrast of head and heart; many virtuous qualities partake of both ingredients.  So the sentiment of conscious worth, or of its opposite, is affected by what is not in our power, as well as by what is; by the goodness or badness of our memory, as well as by continence or dissoluteness of conduct.  Without endowments of the understanding, the best intentions will not procure esteem.

The ancient moralists included in the virtues what are obviously natural endowments.  Prudence, according to Cicero, involved sagacity or powers of judgment.  In Aristotle, we find, among the virtues, Courage, Temperance, Magnanimity, Modesty, Prudence, and manly Openness, as well as Justice and Friendship.  Epictetus puts people on their guard against humanity and compassion.  In general, the difference of voluntary and involuntary was little regarded in ancient ethics.  This is changed in modern times, by the alliance of Ethics with Theology.  The divine has put all morality on the footing of the civil law, and guarded it by the same sanctions of reward and punishment; and consequently must make the distinction of voluntary and involuntary fundamental.

Hume also composed a dialogue, to illustrate, in his light and easy style, the great variety, amounting almost to opposition, of men’s moral sentiments in different ages.  This may seem adverse to his principle of Utility, as it is to the doctrine of an Intuitive Sense of Right and Wrong.  He allows, however, for the different ways that people may view Utility, seeing that the consequences of acting are often difficult to estimate, and people may agree in an end without agreeing in the means.  Still, he pays too little attention to the sentimental likings and dislikings that frequently overbear the sense of Utility; scarcely recognizing it, except in one passage, where he dwells on the superstitions that mingle with a regard to the consequences of actions in determining right.

We shall now repeat the leading points of Hume’s system, in the usual order.

I.—­The Standard of Right and Wrong is Utility, or a reference to the Happiness of mankind.  This is the ground, as wall as the motive, of moral approbation.

II.—­As to the nature of the Moral Faculty, he contends that it is a compound of Reason, and Humane or Generous Sentiment.

He does not introduce the subject of Free-will into Morals.

He contends strongly for the existence of Disinterested Sentiment, or Benevolence; but scarcely recognizes it as leading to absolute and uncompensated self-sacrifice.  He does not seem to see that as far as the approbation of benevolent actions is concerned, we are anything but disinterested parties.  The good done by one man is done to some others; and the recipients are moved by their self-love to encourage beneficence.  The regard to our own benefactor makes all benefactors interesting.