Moral Science; a Compendium of Ethics eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 487 pages of information about Moral Science; a Compendium of Ethics.

Moral Science; a Compendium of Ethics eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 487 pages of information about Moral Science; a Compendium of Ethics.

The deduction of morals from Self-Love is obvious, and no doubt explains much.  An appeal to experience, however, shows its defects.  We praise virtuous actions in remote ages and countries, where our own interests are out of the question.  Even when we have a private interest in some virtuous action, our praise avoids that part of it, and prefers to fasten on what we are not interested in.  When we hear of the details of a generous action, we are moved by it, before we know when or where it took place.  Nor will the force of imagination account for the feeling in those cases; if we have an eye solely to our own real interest, it is not conceivable how we can be moved by a mere imaginary interest.

But another view may be taken.  Some have maintained that the public interest is our own interest, and is therefore promoted by our self-love.  The reply is that the two are often opposed to each other, and still we approve of the preference of the public interest.  We are, therefore, driven to adopt a more public affection, and to admit that the interests of society, on their own, account, are not indifferent to us.

Have we any difficulty to comprehend the force of humanity or benevolence?  Or to conceive that the very aspect of happiness, joy, prosperity, gives pleasure; while pain, suffering, sorrow, communicate uneasiness?  Here we have an unmistakeable, powerful, universal sentiment of human nature to build upon.

The author gives an expanded illustration of the workings of Benevolence or Sympathy, which well deserves to be read for its merits of execution.  We must here content ourselves with stating that it is on this principle of disinterested action, belonging to our nature, that he founds the chief part of our sentiment of Moral Approbation.

Section VI. takes into the account QUALITIES USEFUL TO OURSELVES.  We praise in individuals the qualities useful to themselves, and are pleased with the happiness flowing to individuals by their own conduct.  This can be no selfish motive on our part.  For example, DISCRETION, so necessary to the accomplishing of any useful enterprise, is commended; that measured union of enterprise and caution found in great commanders, is a subject of highest admiration; and why?  For the usefulness, or the success that it brings.  What need is there to display the praises of INDUSTRY, or of FRUGALITY, virtues useful to the possessor in the first instance?  Then the qualities of HONESTY, FIDELITY, and TRUTH, are praised, in the first place, for their tendency to the good of society; and, being established on that foundation, they are also approved as advantageous to the individual’s own self.  A part of our blame of UNCHASTITY in a woman is attached to its imprudence with reference to the opinion regarding it.  STRENGTH OF MIND being to resist present care, and to maintain the search of distant profit and enjoyment, is another quality of great value to the possessor.  The distinction between the Fool and the Wise man illustrates the same position.  In our approbation of all such qualities, it is evident that the happiness and misery of others are not indifferent spectacles to us:  the one, like sunshine, or the prospect of well-cultivated plains, imparts joy and satisfaction; the other, like a lowering cloud or a barren landscape, throws a damp over the spirits.

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Moral Science; a Compendium of Ethics from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.