It is not the author’s intention, however, to pursue the subject in the form of adjudicating between these two principles, but to follow what he deems a simpler method—­to analyze that complication of mental qualities, called PERSONAL MERIT:  to ascertain the attributes or qualities that render a man an object of esteem and affection, or of hatred and contempt.  This is a question of fact, and not of abstract science; and should be determined, as similar questions are, in the modern physics, by following the experimental method, and drawing general maxims from a comparison of particular instances.

Section II. is OF BENEVOLENCE.

His first remark on Benevolence is, that it is identified in all countries with the highest merits that human nature is capable of attaining to.

This prepares the way for the farther observation, that in setting forth the praises of a humane, beneficent man, the one circumstance that never fails to be insisted on is the happiness to society arising through his good offices.  Like the sun, an inferior minister of providence, he cheers, invigorates, and sustains the surrounding world.  May we not therefore conclude that the UTILITY resulting from social virtues, forms, at least, a part of their merit, and is one source of the approbation paid to them.  He illustrates this by a number of interesting examples, and defers the enquiry—­how large a part of the social virtues depend on utility, and for what reason we are so much affected by it.

Section III. is on JUSTICE.  That Justice is useful to society, and thence derives part of its merit, would be superfluous to prove.  That public utility is the sole origin of Justice, and that the beneficial consequences are the sole foundation of its merit, may seem more questionable, but can in the author’s opinion be maintained.

He puts the supposition, that the human race were provided with such abundance of all external things, that without industry, care, or anxiety, every person found every want fully satisfied; and remarks, that while every other social virtue (the affections, &c.) might flourish, yet, as property would be absent, mine and thine unknown, Justice would be useless, an idle ceremonial, and could never come into the catalogue of the virtues.  In point of fact, where any agent, as air, water, or land, is so abundant as to supply everybody, questions of justice do not arise on that particular subject.

Suppose again that in our present necessitous condition, the mind of every man were so enlarged and so replete with generosity that each should feel as much for his fellows as for himself—­the beau ideal of communism—­in this case Justice would be in abeyance, and its ends answered by Benevolence.  This state is actually realized in well-cultivated families; and communism has been attempted and maintained for a time in the ardour of new enthusiasms.