I.—­Mandeville’s object being chiefly negative and dialectical, he has left little of positive ethical theory.  Virtue he regards as de facto an arbitrary institution of society; what it ought to be, he hardly says, but the tendency of his writings is to make the good of the whole to be preferred to private interest.

II.—­He denies the existence of a moral sense and of disinterestedness.  The motive to observe moral rules is pride and vanity fomented by politicians.  He does not regard virtue as an independent end, even by association, but considers that pride in its naked form is the ever present incentive to good conduct.

V.—­The connexion of virtue with society is already fully indicated.

In France, the name of HELVETIUS (author of De l’esprit, De l’homme, &c., 1715-71) is identified with a serious (in contrast to Mandeville), and perfectly consistent, attempt to reduce all morality to direct Self-interest.  Though he adopted this ultimate interpretation of the facts, Helvetius was by no means the ‘low and loose moralist’ that he has been described to be; and, in particular, his own practice displayed a rare benevolence.

DAVID HUME. [1711-1776.]

The Ethical views of Hume are contained in ’An Enquiry concerning the
Principles of Morals.’

In an Introductory Section (I.) he treats of the GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF
MORALS.

After describing those that profess to deny the reality of the distinction of Right and Wrong, as disingenuous disputants, useless to reason with,—­he states the great problem of Morals to be, whether the foundation is REASON or SENTIMENT; whether our knowledge of moral distinctions is attained by a chain of argument and induction, or by an immediate feeling or finer internal sense.

Specious arguments may be urged on both sides.  On the side of Reason, it may be contended, that the justice and injustice of actions are often a subject of argument and controversy like the sciences; whereas if they appealed at once to a sense, they would be as unsusceptible of truth or falsehood as the harmony of verse, the tenderness of passion, or the brilliancy of wit.

In reply, the supporters of Sentiment may urge that the character of virtue is to be amiable, and of vice to be odious, which are not intellectual distinctions.  The end of moral distinctions is to influence the feelings and determine the will, which no mere assent of the understanding can do.  Extinguish our feelings towards virtue and vice, and morality would cease to have any influence on our lives.

The arguments on both sides have so much force in them, that we may reasonably suspect that Reason and Sentiment both concur in our moral determinations.  The final sentence upon actions, whereby we pronounce them praiseworthy or blameable, may depend on the feelings; while a process of the understanding may be requisite to make nice distinctions, examine complicated relations, and ascertain matters of fact.