In Chapter III., he enters into the general notion of Rights and Laws, and their divisions.  From right use of such affection or actions as are approved by the moral faculty from their relation to the general good, or the good of particular persons consistently with the general good, he distinguishes the right of a man to do, possess, demand, &c., which exists when his doing, possessing, &c. tend to the good of society, or to his own, consistent with the rights of others and the general good, and when obstructing him would have the contrary tendency.  He proceeds to argue, on utilitarian principles, that the rights that seem to attend every natural desire are perfectly valid when not against the public interest, but never valid when they are against it.

Chapter IV. contains a discussion upon the state of Nature, maintaining that it is not a state of anarchy or war, but full of rights and obligations.  He points out that independent states in their relation to one another are subject to no common authority, and so are in a state of nature.  Rights belong (1) to individuals, (2) to societies, (3) to mankind at large.  They are also natural, or adventitious, and again perfect or imperfect.

Chapter V. Natural rights are antecedent to society, such as the right to life, to liberty, to private judgment, to marriage, &c.  They are of two kinds—­perfect and imperfect.

Chapter VI.  Adventitious rights are divided into Real and Personal (a distinction chiefly of legal value.) He also examines into the nature and foundation of private property.

Chapter VII. treats of the Acquisition of property, Hutcheson, as is usual with moralists, taking the occupatio of the Roman Law as a basis of ownership.  Property involves the right of (1) use, (2) exclusive use, (3) alienation.

Chapter VIII.  Rights drawn from property are such as mortgages, servitudes, &c., being rights of what may be called partial or imperfect ownership.

Chapter IX. discusses the subject of contracts, with the general conditions required for a valid contract.

Chapter X. Of Veracity.  Like most writers on morals, Hutcheson breaks in upon the strict rule of veracity by various necessary, but ill-defined, exceptions.  Expressions of courtesy and etiquette are exempted, so also artifices in war, answers extorted by unjust violence, and some cases of peculiar necessity, as when a man tells a lie to save thousands of lives.

Chapter XI.  Oaths and Vows.

Chapter XII. belongs rather to Political Economy.  Its subject is the values of goods in commerce, and the nature of coin.

Chapter XIII. enumerates the various classes of contracts, following the Roman Law, taking up Mandatum, Depositum, Letting to Hire, Sale, &c.

Chapter XIV. adds the Roman quasi-contracts.

Chapter XV.  Rights arising from injuries or wrongs (torts).  He condemns duelling, but admits that, where it is established, a man may, in some cases, be justified in sending or accepting a challenge.