of moral action is superior.  It can be trained like any other sense—­hearing, harmony, &c.—­so as to be brought to approve finer objects, for instance the general happiness rather than mere motions of pity.  That it is meant to control and regulate all the other powers is matter of immediate consciousness; we must ever prefer moral good to the good apprehended by the other perceptive powers.  For while every other good is lessened by the sacrifices made to gain it, moral good is thereby increased and relished the more.  The objects of moral approbation are primarily affections of the will, but, all experience shows, only such as tend to the happiness of others, and the moral perfection of the mind possessing them.  There are, however, many degrees of approbation; and, when we put aside qualities that approve themselves merely to the sense of decency or dignity, and also the calm desire of private good, which is indifferent, being neither virtuous nor vicious, the gradation of qualities morally approved may be given thus:  (1) Dignified abilities (pursuit of sciences, &c.), showing a taste above sensuality and selfishness. (2) Qualities immediately connected with virtuous affections—­candour, veracity, fortitude, sense of honour. (3) The kind affections themselves, and the more as they are fixed rather than passionate, and extensive rather than narrow; highest of all in the form of universal good-will to all. (4) The disposition to desire and love moral excellence, whether observed in ourselves or others—­in short, true piety towards God.  He goes on to give a similar scale of moral turpitude.  Again, putting aside the indifferent qualities, and also those that merely make people despicable and prove them insensible, he cites—­(1) the gratification of a narrow kind of affection when the public good might have been served. (2) Acts detrimental to the public, done under fear of personal ill, or great temptation. (3) Sudden angry passions (especially when grown into habits) causing injury. (4) Injury caused by selfish and sensual passions. (5) Deliberate injury springing from calm selfishness. (6) Impiety towards the Deity, as known to be good.  The worst conceivable disposition, a fixed, unprovoked original malice is hardly found among men.  In the end of the chapter, he re-asserts the supremacy of the moral faculty, and of the principle of pure benevolence that it involves.  The inconsistency of the principles of self-love and benevolence when it arises, is reduced in favour of the second by the intervention of the moral sense, which does not hold out future rewards and pleasures of self-approbation, but decides for the generous part by ‘an immediate undefinable perception.’  So at least, if human nature were properly cultivated, although it is true that in common life men are wont to follow their particular affections, generous and selfish, without thought of extensive benevolence or calm self-love; and it is found necessary to counterbalance the advantage that the selfish principles gain in early life, by propping up the moral faculty with considerations of the surest mode of attaining the highest private happiness, and with views of the moral administration of the world by the Deity.