of Honour or Shame, when we are praised or condemned by others.  The Sense of Decency or Dignity, when the mind perceives excellence of bodily and mental powers in ourselves or others, is also natural, and distinct from the moral sense.  Some would allow a natural Sense of the Ridiculous in objects or events.  There follow some remarks on the tendency to associate perceptions.  In addition also to the natural propensity towards action, there is a tendency in repeated action to become Habit, whereby our powers are greatly increased.  Habit and Customs can raise, however, no new ideas beyond the sentiments naturally excited by the original actions.

Sexual desire, wisely postponed by nature beyond the earliest years, does not, in man, end in mere sensual pleasure, but involves a natural liking of beauty as an indication of temper and manners, whereupon grow up esteem and love.  Mankind have a universal desire of offspring, and love for their young; also an affection, though weaker, for all blood-relations.  They have, further, a natural impulse to society with their fellows, as an immediate principle, and are not driven to associate only by indigence.  All the other principles already mentioned, having little or no exercise in solitude, would bring them together, even without family ties.  Patriotism and love of country are acquired in the midst of social order.

Natural Religion inevitably springs up in the best minds at sight of the benevolent order of the world, and is soon diffused among all.  The principles now enumerated will be found, though in varying proportions, among all men not plainly monstrous by accident, &c.

Chapter III. treats of the Ultimate Determinations of the Will and Benevolent Affections.  The question now is to find some order and subordination among the powers that have been cited, and to discover the ultimate ends of action, about which there is no reasoning.  He notices various systems that make calm self-love the one leading principle of action, and specially the system that, allowing the existence of particular disinterested affections, puts the self-satisfaction felt in yielding to the generous sentiments above all other kinds of enjoyments.  But, he asks, is there not also a calm determination towards the good of others, without reference to private interest of any kind?  In the case of particular desires, which all necessarily involve an uneasy sensation until they are gratified, it is no proof of their being selfish that their gratification gives the joy of success and stops uneasiness.  On the other hand, to desire the welfare of others in the interest of ourselves is not benevolence nor virtue.  What we have to seek are benevolent affections terminating ultimately in the good of others, and constituted by nature (either alone, or mayhap corroborated by some views of interest) ’the immediate cause of moral approbation.’  Now, anything to be had from