Public opinion also chimes in with the Law, and adds its own sanction to the legal penalties for offences:  unless the law happens to be in conflict with the popular sentiment.  Criminals, condemned by the law, are additionally punished by social disgrace.

(3) The Law of the Land contains many enactments, besides the Moral Code and the machinery for executing it.  The Province of government passes beyond the properly protective function, and includes many institutions of public convenience, which are not identified with right and wrong.  The defence from external enemies; the erection of works of public utility; the promotion of social improvements,—­are all within the domain of the public authority.[1]

II.—­The second class of Rules are supported, not by penalties, but by Rewards.  Society, instead of punishing men for not being charitable or benevolent, praises and otherwise rewards them, when they are so.  Hence, although Morality inculcates benevolence, this is not a Law proper, it is not obligatory, authoritative, or binding; it is purely voluntary, and is termed merit, virtuous and noble conduct.

In this department, the members of the community, in their unofficial capacity, are the chief agents and administrators.  The Law of the Land occupies itself with the enforcement of its own obligatory rules, having at its command a perfect machinery of punishment.  Private individuals administer praise, honour, esteem, approbation, and reward.  In a few instances, the Government dispenses rewards, as in the bestowal of office, rank, titles, and pensions, but this function is exceptional and limited.

The conduct rewarded by Society is chiefly resolvable into Beneficence.  Whoever is moved to incur sacrifices, or to go through labours, for the good of others, is the object, not merely of gratitude from the persons benefited, but of approbation from society at large.

Any remarkable strictness or fidelity in the discharge of duties properly so called, receives general esteem.  Even in matters merely ceremonial, if importance be attached to them, sedulous and exact compliance, being the distinction of the few, will earn the approbation of the many.[2]

5.  The Ethical End, or Morality, as it has been, is founded partly on Well-being, or Utility:  and partly on Sentiment.

The portions of Morality, having in view the prevention of human misery and the promotion of human happiness, are known and obvious.  They are not the whole of Morality as it has been.

Sentiment, caprice, arbitrary liking or disliking, are names for states of feeling that do not necessarily arise from their objects, but may be joined or disjoined by education, custom, or the power of the will.  The revulsion of mind, on the part of the Jews, against eating the pig, and on our own part, as regards horse flesh, is not a primitive or natural sensibility, like the pain of hunger, or of cold, or of a musical