In his Sermons on Compassion (V., VI.), he treats this as one of the Affections in his second group of the Feelings (Appetites, Passions, and Affections); vindicates its existence against Hobbes, who treated it as an indirect mode of self-regard; and shows its importance in human life, as an adjunct to Rational Benevolence and Conscience.

In discussing Benevolence (Sermon XII.) Butler’s object is to show that it is not ultimately at variance with Self-love.  In the introductory observations, he adverts to the historical fact, that vice and folly take different turns in different ages, and that the peculiarity of his own age is ’to profess a contracted spirit, and greater regards to self-interest’ than formerly.  He accommodates his preaching of virtue to this characteristic of his time, and promises that there shall be all possible concessions made to the favourite passion.

His mode of arguing is still the same as in the sermons on Human Nature.  Self-love does not comprehend our whole being; it is only one principle among many.  It is characterized by a subjective end, the feeling of happiness; but we have other ends of the objective kind, the ends of our appetites, passions, and affections—­food, injury to another, good to another, &c.  The total happiness of our being includes all our ends.  Self-love attends only to one interest, and if we are too engrossed with that, we may sacrifice other interests, and narrow the sphere of our happiness.  A certain disengagement of mind is necessary to enjoyment, and the intensity of pursuit interferes with this. [This is a true remark, but misapplied; external pursuit may be so intense as nearly to do away with subjective consciousness, and therefore with pleasure; but this applies more to objective ends,—­wealth, the interest of others—­than to self-love, which is in its nature subjective.]

Now, what applies to the Appetites and Affections applies to Benevolence; it is a distinct motive or urgency, and should have its scope like every other propensity, in order to happiness.

Such is his reasoning, grounded on his peculiar Psychology.  He then adduces the ordinary arguments to show, that seeking the good of others is a positive gratification in itself, and fraught with pleasure in its consequences.

In summary, Butler’s views stand thus:—­

I.—­His Standard of Right and Wrong is the subjective Faculty, called by him Reflection, or Conscience.  He assumes such an amount of uniformity in human beings, in regard to this Faculty, as to settle all questions that arise.

II.—­His Psychological scheme is the threefold division of the mind already brought out; Conscience being one division, and a distinct and primitive element of our constitution.

He has no Psychology of the Will; nor does he anywhere inquire into the problem of Liberty and Necessity.

He maintains the existence of Disinterested Benevolence, by saying that Disinterested action, as opposed to direct self-regard, is a much wider fact of our mental system, than the regard to the welfare of others.  We have seen that this is a mere stroke of ingenuity, and owes its plausible appearance to his making our associated ends the primary ends of our being.