IV.—He has no peculiar views on the Moral Code, or on the enforcements of Morality.
V.—The connexion of Ethics with Politics is, in him, the assimilating of Morality to Law.
VI.—With reference to Theology, he considers that, by the exercise of the Reason, we may discover the existence and attributes of God, and our duties to him; his ascertained will is the highest moral rule, the true touchstone of Moral Rectitude.
JOSEPH BUTLER. [1692-1752.]
Butler’s Ethical System may be found—First, in a short Dissertation on Virtue, appended to the Analogy; secondly, and chiefly, in his first three Sermons, entitled ‘Human Nature;’ thirdly, in other Sermons, as (V.) on Compassion, and (XL) on Benevolence. Various illustrations of Ethical doctrine are interspersed through the Analogy, as in Part I., Chap. 2, entitled ‘the government of God by rewards and punishments.’
The Dissertation on Virtue is intended to vindicate, in man, the existence of a moral nature, apart from both Prudence and Benevolence.
A moral government supposes a moral nature in man, or a power of distinguishing right from wrong. All men and all systems agree as to the fact of moral perceptions.
As characteristics of these moral perceptions, it is to be noted—First, they refer to voluntary actions. Secondly, they are accompanied with the feelings of good or of ill desert, which good or ill desert is irrespective of the good of society. Thirdly, the perception of ill desert has regard to the capacities of the agent. Fourthly, Prudence, or regard to ourselves, is a fair subject of moral approbation, and imprudence of the contrary. Our own self-interest seems to require strengthening by other men’s manifested pleasure and displeasure. Still, this position is by no means indisputable, and the author is willing to give up the words ‘virtue’ and ‘vice,’ as applicable to prudence and folly; and to contend merely that our moral faculty is not indifferent to this class of actions. Fifthly, Virtue is not wholly resolvable into Benevolence (that is, the general good, or Utility[19]). This is shown by the fact that our approbation is not in proportion to the amount of happiness flowing from an action [he means immediately flowing, which does not decide the question]. We disapprove of falsehood, injustice, and unprovoked violence, even although more happiness would result from them than from the contrary. Moreover, we are not always judges of the whole consequences of acting. Undoubtedly, however, benevolence is our duty, if there be no moral principle to oppose it.
The title ‘Human Nature,’ given to Butler’s chief Ethical exposition, indicates that he does not take an a priori view of the foundations of Ethics, like Cudworth and Clarke, but makes them repose on the constitution of the human mind.
In Sermon first, he lays out the different parts of our Emotional and Active nature, including Benevolence, Self-love, Conscience. The recognition of these three as distinct, and mutually irresolvable, is the Psychological basis of his Ethics.[20]