Moral Science; a Compendium of Ethics eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 487 pages of information about Moral Science; a Compendium of Ethics.

Moral Science; a Compendium of Ethics eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 487 pages of information about Moral Science; a Compendium of Ethics.

3.  He expressly leaves aside the supposition that we have innate ideas of the laws of Nature whereby conduct is to be guided, or of the matters that they are conversant about.  He has not, he says, been so happy as to learn the laws of Nature by so short a way, and thinks it ill-advised to build the doctrine of natural religion and morality upon a hypothesis that has been rejected by the generality of philosophers, as well heathen as Christian, and can never be proved against the Epicureans, with whom lies his chief controversy.  Yet he declines to oppose the doctrine of innate ideas, because it looks with a friendly eye upon piety and morality; and perhaps it may be the case, that such ideas are both born with us and afterwards impressed upon us from without.

4.  Will, he defines as ’the consent of the mind with the judgment of the understanding, concerning things agreeing among themselves.’  Although, therefore, he supposes that nothing but Good and Evil can determine the will, and that the will is even necessarily determined to seek the one and flee the other, he escapes the conclusion that the will is moved only by private good, by accepting the implication of private with common good as the fixed judgment of the understanding or right reason.

5.  He argues against the resolution of all Benevolence into self-seeking, and thus claims for man a principle of disinterested action.  But what he is far more concerned to prove is, that benevolence of all to all accords best with the whole frame of nature, stands forth with perfect evidence, upon a rational apprehension of the universe, as the great Law of Nature, and is the most effectual means of promoting the happiness of individuals, viz., through the happiness of all.

III.—­Happiness is given as connected with the most full and constant exercise of all our powers, about the best and greatest objects and effects that are adequate and proportional to them; as consisting in the enlargement or perfection of the faculties of any one thing or several.  Here, and in his protest against Hobbes’s taking affection and desire, instead of Reason, as the measure of the goodness of things, may be seen in what way he passes from the conception of Individual, to the notion of Common Good, as the end of action.  Reason affirms the common good to be more essentially connected with the perfection of man than any pursuit of private advantage.  Still there is no disposition in him to sacrifice private to the common good:  he declares that no man is called on to promote the common good beyond his ability, and attaches no meaning to the general good beyond the special good of all the particular rational agents in their respective places, from God (to whom he ventures to ascribe a Tranquillity, Joy, or Complacency) downwards.  The happiness of men he considers as Internal, arising immediately from the vigorous exercise of the faculties about their proper and noblest objects; and External, the mediate advantages procurable from God and men by a course of benevolent action.

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Moral Science; a Compendium of Ethics from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.