as far as may be, of the means to its enjoyment.  With beasts there is no covenant, because no proper mutual understanding.  With God also none, except through special revelation, or with his lieutenant in his name.  Anything vowed contrary to the law of nature is vowed in vain; if the thing vowed is commanded by the law of nature, the law, not the vow, binds.  Covenants are of things possible and future.  Men are freed from them by performance, or forgiveness, which is restitution of liberty.  He pronounces covenants extorted by fear to be binding alike in the state of mere nature and in commonwealths, if once entered into.  A former covenant makes void a later.  Any covenant not to defend one’s self from force by force is always void; as said above, there is no transference possible of right to defend one’s self from death, wounds, imprisonment, &c.  So no man is obliged to accuse himself, or generally to give testimony where from the nature of the case it may be presumed to be corrupted.  Accusation upon torture is not to be reputed as testimony.  At the close he remarks upon oaths.  He finds in human nature two imaginable helps to strengthen the force of words, otherwise too weak to insure the performance of covenants.  One of these—­pride in appearing not to need to break one’s word, he supposes too rare to be presumed upon.  The other, fear, has reference either to power of spirits invisible, or of men.  In the state of nature, it is the first kind of fear—­a man’s religion—­that keeps him to his promises.  An oath is therefore swearing to perform by the God a man fears.  But to the obligation itself it adds nothing.

Of the other Laws of Nature, treated in Chap.  XV., the third, that men perform their covenants made, opens up the discussion of Justice.  Till rights have been transferred and covenants made there is no justice or injustice; injustice is no other than the non-performance of covenants.  Further, justice (and also property) begins only where a regular coercive power is constituted, because otherwise there is cause for fear, and fear, as has been seen, makes covenants invalid.  Even the scholastic definition of justice recognizes as much; for there can be no constant will of giving to every man his own, when, as in the state of nature, there is no own.  He argues at length against the idea that justice, i.e., the keeping of covenants, is contrary to reason; repelling three different arguments. (1) He demonstrates that it cannot be reasonable to break or keep covenants according to benefit supposed to be gained in each case, because this would be a subversion of the principles whereon society is founded, and must end by depriving the individual of its benefits, whereby he would be left perfectly helpless. (2) He considers it frivolous to talk of securing the happiness of heaven by any kind of injustice, when there is but one possible way of attaining it, viz., the keeping