the manifestation of value.  He goes through all the signs of honour and dishonour. Honourable is any possession, action, or quality that is the sign of power.  Where there is the opinion of power, the justice or injustice of an action does not affect the honour.  He clearly means a universally accepted opinion of power, and cites the characters of the pagan deities.  So, too, before times of civil order, it was held no dishonour to be a pirate, and even still, duels, though unlawful, are honourable, and will be till there be honour ordained for them that refuse.  Farther on, he distinguishes Worthiness, (1) from worth, and (2) from merit, or the possession of a particular ability or desert, which, as will be seen, presupposes a right to a thing, founded on a promise.

Chapter XI. bears the title, Of the difference of Manners; by manners being meant, not decency of behaviour and points of the ‘small morals,’ but the qualities of mankind that concern their living together in peace and unity.  Felicity of life, as before, he pronounces to be a continual progress of desire, there being no finis ultimus nor summum bonum.  The aim of all men is, therefore, not only to enjoy once and for an instant, but to assure for over the way of future desire.  Men differ in their way of doing so, from diversity of passion and their different degrees of knowledge.  One thing he notes as common to all, a restless and perpetual desire of power after power, because the present power of living well depends on the acquisition of more.  Competition inclines to contention and war.  The desire of ease, on the other hand, and fear of death or wounds, dispose to civil obedience.  So also does desire of knowledge, implying, as it does, desire of leisure.  Desire of praise and desire of fame after death dispose to laudable actions; in such fame, there is a present delight from foresight of it, and of benefit redounding to posterity; for pleasure to the sense is also pleasure in the imagination.  Unrequitable benefits from an equal engender secret hatred, but from a superior, love; the cheerful acceptation, called gratitude, requiting the giver with honour.  Requitable benefits, even from equals or inferiors, dispose to love; for hence arises emulation in benefiting—­’the most noble and profitable contention possible, wherein the victor is pleased with his victory, and the other revenged by confessing it.’  He passes under review other dispositions, such as fear of oppression, vain-glory, ambition, pusillanimity, frugality, &c., with reference to the course of conduct they prompt to.  Then he comes to a favourite subject, the mistaken courses whereinto men fall that are ignorant of natural causes and the proper signification of words.  The effect of ignorance of the causes of right, equity, law, and justice, is to make custom and example the rule of actions, as with children, or to induce the setting of custom against reason, and reason against custom, whereby the doctrine of right and wrong is perpetually disputed, both by the pen, and by the sword.  Again, taking up ignorance of the laws of nature, he is led on to the subject of natural Religion, and devotes also the whole of Chapter XII. to Religion and kindred topics.