All the other passions, he now proceeds to show, are these simple passions—­appetite, desire, love, aversion, hate, joy, and grief, diversified in name for divers considerations.  Incidental remarks of ethical importance are these. Covetousness, the desire of riches, is a name signifying blame, because men contending for them are displeased with others attaining them; the desire itself, however, is to be blamed or allowed, according to the means whereby the riches are sought. Curiosity is a lust of the mind, that by a perseverance of delight in the continual generation of knowledge, exceedeth the short vehemence of any carnal pleasure. Pity is grief for the calamity of another, arising from the imagination of the like calamity befalling one’s self; the best men have, therefore, least pity for calamity arising from great wickedness. Contempt, or little sense of the calamity of others, proceeds from security of one’s own fortune; ’for that any man should take pleasure in other men’s great harms, without other end of his own, I do not conceive it possible.’

Having explained the various passions, he then gives his theory of the Will.  He supposes a liberty in man of doing or omitting, according to appetite or aversion.  But to this liberty an end is put in the state of deliberation wherein there is kept up a constant succession of alternating desires and aversions, hopes and fears, regarding one and the same thing.  One of two results follows.  Either the thing is judged impossible, or it is done; and this, according as aversion or appetite triumphs at the last.  Now, the last aversion, followed by omission, or the last appetite, followed by action, is the act of Willing.  Will is, therefore, the last appetite (taken to include aversion) in deliberating.  So-called Will, that has been forborne, was inclination merely; but the last inclination with consequent action (or omission) is Will, or voluntary action.

After mentioning the forms of speech where the several passions and appetites are naturally expressed, and remarking that the truest signs of passion are in the countenance, motions of the body, actions, and ends or aims otherwise known to belong to a man,—­he returns to the question of good and evil.  It is apparent good and evil, come at by the best possible foresight of all the consequences of action, that excite the appetites and aversions in deliberation. Felicity he defines continual success in obtaining the things from time to time desired; perpetual tranquillity of mind being impossible in this life, which is but motion, and cannot be without desire and fear any more than without sense.  The happiness of the future life is at present unknown.

Men, he says at the close, praise the goodness, and magnify the greatness, of a thing; the Greeks had also the word [Greek:  makarismos], to express an opinion of a man’s felicity.