In the first part of the Leviathan, then, bearing the title Of Man, and designed to consider Man as at once the matter and artificer of the Commonwealth or State, Hobbes is led, after discussing Sense, Imagination, Train of Imaginations, Speech, Reason and Science, to take up, in chapter sixth, the Passions, or, as he calls them, the Interior beginnings of voluntary motions.  Motions, he says, are either vital and animal, or voluntary.  Vital motions, e.g., circulation, nutrition, &c., need no help of imagination; on the other hand, voluntary motions, as going and speaking—­since they depend on a precedent thought of whither, which way, and what—­have in the imagination their first beginning.  But imagination is only the relics of sense, and sense, as Hobbes always declares, is motion in the human organs communicated by objects without; consequently, visible voluntary motions begin in invisible internal motions, whose nature is expressed by the word Endeavour.  When the endeavour is towards something causing it, there is Appetite or Desire; endeavour ‘fromward something’ is Aversion.  These very words, and the corresponding terms in Greek, imply an actual, not—­as the schoolmen absurdly think—­a metaphorical motion.  Passing from the main question, he describes Love and Hate as Desire and Aversion when the object is present.  Of appetites, some are born with us, others proceed from experience, being of particular things.  Where we neither desire nor hate, we contemn [he means, disregard].  Appetites and aversions vary in the same person, and much more in different persons.

Then follows his definition of good,—­the object of any man’s appetite or desire, as evil is the object of his hate and aversion.  Good and evil are always merely relative, either to the person of a man, or in a commonwealth to the representative person, or to an arbitrator if chosen to settle a dispute.  Good in the promise is pulchrum, for which there is no exact English term; good in the effect, as the end desired, is delightful; good as the means, is useful or profitable.  There is the same variety of evil.

His next topic is Pleasure.  As sense is, in reality, motion, but, in ‘apparence,’ light or sound or odour; so appetite, in reality a motion or endeavour effected in the heart by the action of objects through the organs of sense, is, in ‘apparence,’ delight or trouble of mind.  The emotion, whose apparence (i.e., subjective side) is pleasure or delight, seems to be a corroboration of vital motion; the contrary, in the case of molestation.  Pleasure is, therefore, the sense of good; displeasure, the sense of evil.  The one accompanies, in greater or less degree, all desire and love; the other, all aversion and hatred.  Pleasures are either of sense; or of the mind, when arising-from the expectation that proceeds from the foresight of the ends or consequence of things, irrespective of their pleasing the senses or not.  For these mental pleasures, there is the general name joy.  There is a corresponding division of displeasure into pain and grief.