be named the self-existent.  Again, if Isvara be the maker, all living things should silently submit, patient beneath the maker’s power, and then what use to practise virtue?  Twere equal, then, the doing right or wrong:  there should be no reward of works; the works themselves being his making, then all things are the same with him, the maker, but if all things are one with him, then our deeds, and we who do them, are also self-existent.  But if Isvara be uncreated, then all things, being one with him, are uncreated.  But if you say there is another cause beside him as creator, then Isvara is not the ’end of all’; Isvara, who ought to be inexhaustible, is not so, and therefore all that lives may after all be uncreated—­without a maker.  Thus, you see, the thought of Isvara is overthrown in this discussion; and all such contradictory assertions should be exposed; if not, the blame is ours.  Again, if it be said self-nature is the maker, this is as faulty as the first assertion; nor has either of the Hetuvidya sastras asserted such a thing as this, till now.  That which depends on nothing cannot as a cause make that which is; but all things round us come from a cause, as the plant comes from the seed; we cannot therefore say that all things are produced by self-nature.  Again, all things which exist spring not from one nature as a cause; and yet you say self-nature is but one:  it cannot then be cause of all.  If you say that that self-nature pervades and fills all places, if it pervades and fills all things, then certainly it cannot make them too; for there would be nothing, then, to make, and therefore this cannot be the cause.  If, again, it fills all places and yet makes all things that exist, then it should throughout ‘all time’ have made forever that which is.  But if you say it made things thus, then there is nothing to be made ‘in time’; know then, for certain, self-nature cannot be the cause of all.  Again, they say that that self-nature excludes all modifications, therefore all things made by it ought likewise to be free from modifications.  But we see, in fact, that all things in the world are fettered throughout by modifications; therefore, again, we say that self-nature cannot be the cause of all.  If, again, you say that that self-nature is different from such qualities, we answer, since self-nature must have ever caused, it cannot differ in its nature from itself; but if the world be different from these qualities, then self-nature cannot be the cause.  Again, if self-nature be unchangeable, so things should also be without decay; if we regard self-nature as the cause, then cause and consequence of reason should be one; but because we see decay in all things, we know that they at least are caused.  Again, if self-nature be the cause, why should we seek to find ‘escape’? for we ourselves possess this nature; patient then should we endure both birth and death.  For let us take the case that one may find ‘escape,’ self-nature still will reconstruct the evil of birth.  If