The tactics of the Volunteers as they began to emerge were reduced to the very skeleton of “strategy.”  It was only that they seized certain central and stragetical districts, garrisoned those and held them until they were put out of them.  Once in their forts there was no further egress by the doors, and for purpose of entry and sortie they used the skylights and the roofs.  On the roofs they had plenty of cover, and this cover conferred on them a mobility which was their chief asset, and which alone enabled them to protract the rebellion beyond the first day.

This was the entire of their home plan, and there is no doubt that they had studied Dublin roofs and means of inter-communication by roofs with the closest care.  Further than that I do not think they had organised anything.  But this was only the primary plan, and, unless they were entirely mad, there must have been a sequel to it which did not materialise, and which would have materialised but that the English Fleet blocked the way.

There is no doubt that they expected the country to rise with them, and they must have known what their own numbers were, and what chance they had of making a protracted resistance.  The word “resistance” is the keyword of the rising, and the plan of holding out must have been rounded off with a date.  At that date something else was to have happened which would relieve them.

There is not much else that could happen except the landing of German troops in Ireland or in England.  It would have been, I think, immaterial to them where these were landed, but the reasoning seems to point to the fact that they expected and had arranged for such a landing, although on this point there is as yet no evidence.

The logic of this is so simple, so plausible, that it might be accepted without further examination, and yet further examination is necessary, for in a country like Ireland logic and plausibility are more often wrong than right.  It may just as easily be that except for furnishing some arms and ammunition Germany was not in the rising at all, and this I prefer to believe.  It had been current long before the rising that the Volunteers knew they could not seriously embarass England, and that their sole aim was to make such a row in Ireland that the Irish question would take the status of an international one, and on the discussion of terms of peace in the European war the claims of Ireland would have to be considered by the whole Council of Europe and the world.

That is, in my opinion, the metaphysic behind the rising.  It is quite likely that they hoped for German aid, possibly some thousands of men, who would enable them to prolong the row, but I do not believe they expected German armies, nor do I think they would have welcomed these with any cordiality.

In this insurrection there are two things which are singular in the history of Irish risings.  One is that there were no informers, or there were no informers among the chiefs.  I did hear people say in the streets that two days before the rising they knew it was to come; they invariably added that they had not believed the news, and had laughed at it.  A priest said the same thing in my hearing, and it may be that the rumour was widely spread, and that everybody, including the authorities, looked upon it as a joke.