And if in the present work, which is named “Convito”—­the Banquet, the glad Life Together—­I desire that the subject should be discussed more maturely than in the Vita Nuova—­the New Life—­I do not therefore mean in any degree to undervalue that Fresh Life, but greatly to enhance it; seeing how reasonable it is for that age to be fervid and passionate, and for this to be mature and temperate.  At one age it is fit to speak and work in one way, and at another age in another way; because certain manners are fit and praiseworthy at one age which are improper and blameable at another, as will be demonstrated with suitable argument in the fourth treatise of this Book.  In that first Book (Vita Nuova) at the entrance into my youth I spoke; and in this latter I speak after my youth has already passed away.  And since my true meaning may be other than that which the aforesaid songs show forth, I mean by an allegoric exposition to explain these after the literal argument shall have been reasoned out:  so that the one argument with the other shall give a relish to those who are the guests invited to this Banquet.  And of them all I pray that if the feast be not so splendid as befits the proclamation thereof, let them impute each defect, not to my will but to my means, since my will here is to a full and loving Liberality.

CHAPTER II.

In preparing for every well-ordered Banquet the servants are wont to take the proper bread, and see that it is clean from all blemish; wherefore I, who in the present writing stand in servant’s place, intend firstly to remove two spots from this exposition which at my repast stands in the place of bread.

The one is, that it appears to be unlawful for any one to speak of himself; the other, that it seems to be unreasonable to speak too deeply when giving explanations.  Let the knife of my judgment pare away from the present treatise the unlawful and the unreasonable.  One does not permit any Rhetorician to speak of himself without a necessary cause.  And from this is the man removed, because he can speak of no one without praise or blame of those of whom he speaks; which two causes commonly induce a man to speak of himself.  And in order to remove a doubt which here arises, I say that it is worse for any one to blame than to praise himself, although neither may have to be done.  The reason is, that anything which is essentially wrong is worse than that which is wrong through accident.  For a man openly to bring contempt on himself is essentially wrong to his friend, because a man owes it to take account of his fault secretly, and no one is more friendly to himself than the man himself.  In the chamber of his thoughts, therefore, he should reprove himself and weep over his faults, and not before the world.  Again, a man is but seldom blamed when he has not the power or the knowledge requisite to guide himself aright:  but he is always blamed when weak of will, because