those persons met did not endanger the public peace.  None of those persons carried arms.  Thousands of those persons were women and children.  There was no injury or offence attempted to be committed against anybody, and no disturbance of the peace took place. 3.  In the third place the assembly caused no alarm to the peaceable subjects of the Queen—­there is not a tittle of evidence to that effect. 4.  In the fourth place the assembly did not create disaffection, neither was it intended or calculated to create disaffection.  On the contrary, the assembly served to give peaceful expression to the opinion entertained by vast numbers of her Majesty’s peaceful subjects upon a public act of the servants of the crown, an act which vast numbers of the Queen’s subjects regretted and condemned.  And thus the assembly was calculated to prevent or remove disaffection, and such open and peaceful manifestations of the real opinions of the Queen’s subjects upon public affairs is the proper, safe, and constitutional way in which they may aid to prevent disaffection. 5.  In the fifth place the assembly did not incite the Irish subjects of the Queen to hate her Majesty’s subjects.  On the contrary, it was a proper constitutional way of bringing about a right understanding upon a transaction which, if not fairly and fully explained and set right, must produce hatred between the two peoples.  That transaction was calculated to produce hatred.  But those who protest peaceably against such a transaction are not the party to be blamed, but those responsible for the transaction. 6.  In the sixth place the assembly had no purpose of aspersing the right and constitutional administration of justice.  Its tendency was peaceably to point out faults in the conduct of the servants of the crown, charged with the administration of justice, which faults were calculated to bring the administration of justice into disrepute. 7.  Nor, in the seventh place, did the assembly impair the functions of justice, or intend or tend to do so.  Even my prosecutors do not allege that judicial tribunals are infallible.  It would be too absurd to make such an allegation in plain words.  It is admitted on all hands that judges have sometimes given wrong directions, that juries have given wrong verdicts, that courts of justice have wrongfully appreciated the whole matter for trial.  When millions of the Queen’s subjects think that such wrong has been done, is it sedition for them to say so peaceably and publicly?  On the contrary, the constitutional way for good citizens to act in striving to keep the administration of justice pure and above suspicion of unfairness, is by such open and peaceable protests.  Thus, and thus only, may the functions of justice be saved from being impaired.  In this case wrong had been done.  Five men had been tried together upon the same evidence, and convicted together upon that evidence, and while one of the five was acknowledged by the crown to be innocent, and the