to the tribe and to the individual, which at last
acts so spontaneously and rapidly in giving its verdict
on anything, that we regard it as a special sense.
It would of course be possible to expend much time
and many words in argument on this subject. There
is not, and never will be, any direct evidence as
to the origin of conscience; and as that sense (like
any other power of our mental nature) is capable of
being educated, evoked, enlightened, and strengthened,
and may also by neglect and contradiction deteriorate
and wither away, there is ample room for allowing a
certain part of the theory.[3] But many people who
examine their own conscience will feel that the description
certainly does not suit them; there are many things
which conscience disapproves, of which no great evil
consequences to themselves or any one else are felt.
Conscience is constantly condemning “the way
that seemeth good unto a man.” Ultimately
no doubt, there is real evil at the end of everything
that conscience warns a man against; but not such
as “inherited experience” is likely to
recognize. Is it, for instance, the experience
of the mass of men, as men, that the “fleshly
mind is death, but the spiritual mind is life and
peace”? Is not rather the world at large
habitually putting money-making, position-making,
and the care of the things of the body, of time, and
of sense, in the first place; and is not the moral
law perpetually warning us that the fashion of the
world passes away, and that what seems gold is in
reality tinsel? As far as the condemnation that
conscience passes on the broad evils which affect society—“thou
shalt not steal,” “thou shalt not lie,”
or so forth—no doubt it is supported by
the transmitted sense of inconvenience; but who has
told it of the evil of things that do not affect our
social state? and who has changed the inconvenient,
the painful, into the wrong? It is one
thing to instinctively avoid a theft or a falsehood,
even if the first origin of such instinct were the
fear of consequences or the love of approbation; it
is quite another—the inward condemnation
of something which “the deceitfulness of sin”
is able to excuse, and which the world at large would
regard as permissible or at least venial. Even
if inherited use has its full play, there is still
a something wanted before the one can be got into
(or out of) the other. Why, again, are savages
prone to imagine natural phenomena to be caused or
actuated by “spirits”? Surely it
is because there is consciously a spirit in
man, and a Higher Power, even God, outside, who exists,
though man in his ignorance has many false ideas regarding
Him.