[Footnote 1:  No. 331, July, 1885, p. 223.]

Moreover, as to the question of the possibility of human development generally, there are certain considerations which directly support our belief.  For example, directly we look to the characteristic point, the gift of intellect, we can reasonably argue that the action of a Creator is indispensable.  The entrance of consciousness and of reason, however elementary, marks something out of all analogy with the development of physical structure, just as much as the entrance of Life marked a new departure in no analogy with the “properties” of inorganic matter.

From the first dawn of what looks like will and choice between two things, and something like a reason which directs the course of the organism in a particular way for a particular object, we have an altogether new departure.  The difficulty commences at the outset, and even in the animal creation; it is merely continued and rendered more striking when we take into consideration the higher development of intellect into power of abstract reasoning, self-consciousness and God-consciousness.

It is perfectly true that the difference between the “instinct” of animals and the reason and mind of man, is one of degree rather than kind.  As Christians, we have no objection whatever to a development of reason from the lowest reason solely concerned with earthly and bodily affairs to the highest powers searching into deep and spiritual truths.  But such a development, though it is parallel to a physical development—­as spiritual law appears to be always parallel (as far as the nature of things permits) to physical laws—­still is a development which cannot under any possible circumstances dispense with an external spiritual order of existence, and one which cannot be physically caused.  Nor is it conceivable that man should develop a consciousness of God, when no God really exists externally to the consciousness.[1]

[Footnote 1:  For our consciousness of God is obviously very different from a figment of the imagination, or the sort of reality experienced in a dream.  This is not the place to develop such an argument, but it seems to me more than doubtful whether we can even imagine something absolutely non-existent in nature.  When the artist’s imagination would construct, e.g., a winged dragon, the concept is always made up of parts which are real—­eyes like an alligator, bat-wings, scales of a fish or crocodile, and so forth.  All the members or parts are real, put together to form the unreal.  I do not believe that any instance of a human conception can be brought forward which on analysis will not conform to this rule.]