In short, a presidential government, or a hereditary government are inferior to parliamentary government as administrative selectors.  The revolutionary despot may indeed prove better, since his existence depends on his skill in doing so.  If the English government is not celebrated for efficiency, that is largely because it attempts to do so much; but it is defective also from our ignorance.  Another reason is that in the English constitution the dignified parts, which have an importance of their own, at the same time tend to diminish simple efficiency.

V.—­Checks, Balances, and History

In every state there must be somewhere a supreme authority on every point.  In some states, however, that ultimate power is different upon different points.  The Americans, under the mistaken impression that they were imitating the English, made their constitution upon this principle.  The sovereignty rested with the separate states, which have delegated certain powers to the central government.  But the division of the sovereignty does not end here.  Congress rules the law, but the president rules the administration.  Even his legislative veto can be overruled when two-thirds of both houses are unanimous.  The administrative power is divided, since on international policy the supreme authority is the senate.  Finally, the constitution itself can only be altered by authorities which are outside the constitution.  The result is that now, after the civil war, there is no sovereign authority to settle immediate problems.

In England, on the other hand, we have the typical constitution, in which the ultimate power upon all questions is in the hands of the same person.  The ultimate authority in the English constitution is a newly-elected House of Commons.  Whatever the question on which it decides, a new House of Commons can despotically and finally resolve.  No one can doubt the importance of singleness and unity.  The excellence in the British constitution is that it has achieved this unity.  This is primarily due to the provision which places the choice of the executive in “the people’s house.”  But it could not have been effected without what I may call the “safety valve” and “the regulator.”  The “safety valve” is the power of creating peers, the “regulator” is the cabinet’s power of dissolving.  The defects of a popular legislature are:  caprice in selection, the sectarianism born of party organisation, which is the necessary check on caprice, and the peculiar prejudices and interests of the particular parliament.  Now the caprice of parliament in the choice of a premier is best checked by the premier himself having the power of dissolution.  But as a check on sectarianism such an extrinsic power as that of a capable constitutional king is more efficient.  For checking the peculiar interests our colonial governors seem almost perfectly qualified.  But the intervention of a constitutional monarch is only beneficial if he happens to be an exceptionally wise man.  The peculiar interests of a specific parliament are seldom in danger of overriding national interests; hence, on the whole, the advantage of the premier being the real dissolving authority.