The House of Lords has the advantage:  first, of being possible; secondly, of being independent.  It is accessible to no social bribe, and it has leisure.  On the other hand, it has defects.  In appearance, which is the important thing, it is apathetic.  Next, it belongs exclusively to one class, that of landowners.  This would not so greatly matter if the House of Lords could be of more than common ability, but being an hereditary chamber, it cannot be so.  There is only one kind of business in which our aristocracy retain a certain advantage.  This is diplomacy.  And aristocracy is, in its nature, better suited to such work.  It is trained to the theatrical part of life; it is fit for that if it is fit for anything.  Otherwise an aristocracy is inferior in business.  These various defects would have been lessened if the House of Lords had not resisted the creation of life peers.

The dignified aspect of the House of Commons is altogether secondary to its efficient use.  Its main function is to choose our president.  It elects the people whom it likes, and it dismisses whom it dislikes, too.  The premier is to the house what the house is to the nation.  He must lead, but he can only lead whither they will follow.  Its second function is expressive, to express the mind of the English people.  Thirdly, it ought to teach the nation.  Fourthly, to give information, especially of grievances—­not, as in the old days, to the crown, but to the nation.  And, lastly, there is the function of legislation.  I do not separate the financial function from the rest of the legislative.  In financial affairs it lies under an exceptional disability; it is only the minister who can propose to tax the people, whereas on common subjects any member can propose anything.  The reason is that the house is never economical; but the cabinet is forced to be economical, because it has to impose the taxation to meet, the expenditure.

Of all odd forms of government, the oddest really is this government by public meeting.  How does it come to be able to govern at all?  The principle of parliament is obedience to leaders.  Change your leader if you will, but while you have him obey him, otherwise you will not be able to do anything at all.  Leaders to-day do not keep their party together by bribes, but they can dissolve.  Party organisation is efficient because it is not composed of warm partisans.  The way to lead is to affect a studied and illogical moderation.

Nor are the leaders themselves eager to carry party conclusions too far.  When an opposition comes into power, ministers have a difficulty in making good their promises.  They are in contact with the facts which immediately acquire an inconvenient reality.  But constituencies are immoderate and partisan.  The schemes both of extreme democrats and of philosophers for changing the system of representation would prevent parliamentary government from working at all.  Under a system of equal electoral districts and one-man vote, a parliament could not consist of moderate men.  Mr. Hare’s scheme would make party bands and fetters tighter than ever.