in the world, is, of course, no Pyrrhonist.  He profoundly distrusts the capacity of the intellect, acting as a pure organ of speculation, to unriddle the mysteries of existence; he maintains, on the other hand, that knowledge sufficient for the conduct of our lives is involved in the simple experiences of good and evil, of joy and sorrow.  In reality Browning’s attitude towards truth approaches more nearly what has now begun to style itself “Pragmatism” than it approaches Pyrrhonism; but philosophers whose joy is to beat the air may find that it is condemnatory of their methods.

In his distrust of metaphysical speculation and in regarding the affections as superior to the intellect, Browning as a teacher has something in common with Comte; but there is perhaps no creed so alien to his nature as the creed of Positivism.  The last of Ferishtah’s discourses is concerned with the proportion which happiness bears to pain in the average life of man, or rather—­for Browning is nothing if he is not individualistic—­in the life of each man as an individual.  The conclusion arrived at is that no “bean-stripe”—­each bean, white or black, standing for a day—­is wholly black, and that the more extended is our field of vision the more is the general aspect of the “bean-stripe” of a colour intermediate between the extremes of darkness and of light.  Before the poem closes, Browning turns aside to consider the Positivist position.  Why give our thanks and praise for all the good things of life to God, whose existence is an inference of the heart derived from its own need of rendering gratitude to some Being like ourselves?  Are not these good things the gifts of the race, of Humanity, and its worthies who have preceded us and who at the present moment constitute our environment of loving help?  Ferishtah’s reply, which is far from conclusive, must be regarded as no discussion of the subject but the utterance of an isolated thought.  Praise rendered to Humanity and the heroes of the race simply reverts to the giver of the praise; his own perceptions of what is praiseworthy alone render praise possible; he must first of all thank and praise the giver of such perceptions—­God.  It is strange that Browning should fail to recognise the fact that the Positivist would immediately trace the power of moral perception to the energies of Humanity in its upward progress from primitive savagery to our present state of imperfect development.

It has been necessary to transcribe in a reduced form the teaching of Ferishtah, for this is the clearest record left by Browning of his own beliefs on the most important of all subjects, this is an essential part of his criticism of life, and at the same time it is little less than a passage of autobiography.  The poems are admirable in their vigour, their humour, their seriousness, their felicity of imagery.  Yet the wisdom of Ferishtah’s Fancies is an old man’s wisdom; we perceive in it the inner life, as Baxter puts it, in speaking of changes