wrong to the country, and to a most meritorious and honorable brother officer.  I have heard, in such way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the army and the government needed a dictator.  Of course, it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the command.  Only those generals who gain successes can set up as dictators.  What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship.  The government will support you to the utmost of its ability,—­which is neither more nor less than it has done and will do for all commanders.  I much fear that the spirit which you have aided to infuse into the army, of criticising their commander and withholding confidence from him, will now turn upon you.  I shall assist you as far as I can to put it down.  Neither you nor Napoleon, if he were alive again, could get any good out of an army while such a spirit prevails in it.  And now, beware of rashness.  Beware of rashness, but, with energy and sleepless vigilance, go forward and give us victories.”

Hooker was of that class of generals who show such capacity as lieutenants that they are supposed to be capable of becoming independent chiefs, until their true measure is ascertained by actual trial.  In two months he had restored to good shape an army which he had found demoralized and depleted by absenteeism, and at the end of April he had under him about 124,500 men.  He still lay on the north bank of the Potomac, facing Lee’s army in its intrenchments about Fredericksburg.  His plan of campaign, says General Doubleday, was “simple, efficacious, and should have been successful.”  Diverting the attention of Lee, he threw the chief part of his army across the Rappahannock several miles above Fredericksburg; then, marching rapidly to Chancellorsville, he threatened the left flank and rear of the Confederates.  Pushing a short distance out upon the three roads which led from Chancellorsville to Fredericksburg, he came to the very edge and brink, as it were, of beginning a great battle with good promise of success.  But just at this point his generals at the front were astounded by orders to draw back to Chancellorsville.  Was it that he suddenly lost nerve in the crisis of his great responsibility?[44] Or was it possible that he did not appreciate the opportunity which he was throwing away?  No one can say.  Only the fact can be stated that he rejected the chance which offended Fortune never offers a second time.  Back came the advanced columns, and took position at Chancellorsville, while Lee, who had not the Northern habit of repudiating fair opportunity, pressed close upon them.