a man as ever made use of grand opportunities only to prove his own incompetence.  Now, however, he came well recommended before Lincoln, and amid novel responsibilities the merit of any man could only be known by trial.  Halleck did not arrive in Washington till near the end of the month, then he seemed for a while in doubt, or to be upon both sides of the question as to whether the army should be advanced or withdrawn; but ultimately, in the contemptuous language of Mr. Swinton, he “added his strident voice in favor of the withdrawal of the army from the Peninsula.”  This settled the matter; for the President had decided to place himself under the guidance of his new military mentor; and, moreover, his endurance was worn out.

In the way of loyalty the President certainly owed nothing further to the general.  All such obligations he had exhaustively discharged.  In spite of the covert malicious suggestions and the direct injurious charges which tortured the air of the White House and vexed his judgment, he had sustained McClellan with a constancy which deserved warm gratitude.  This the general never gave, because he could never forgive Mr. Lincoln for refusing to subordinate his own views to those of such a military expert as himself.  This point, it is true, Lincoln never reached; but subject only to this independence of opinion and action, so long as he retained McClellan in command, he fulfilled toward him every requirement of honor and generosity.  The movement across the Peninsula, whatever construction might possibly be put upon it, seemed in Washington a retreat, and was for the President a disappointment weighty enough to have broken the spirit of a smaller man.  Yet Lincoln, instead of sacrificing McClellan as a scapegoat, sent to him on July 1 and 2 telegrams bidding him do his best in the emergency and save his army, in which case the people would rally and repair all losses; “we still have strength enough in the country and will bring it out,” he said,—­words full of cheering resolution unshaded by a suspicion of reproach, words which should have come like wine to the weary.  The next day, July 3, he sent a dispatch which even McClellan, in his formal report, described as “kind:”  “I am satisfied that yourself, officers, and men have done the best you could.  All accounts say better fighting was never done.  Ten thousand thanks for it.”  But when it came to judgment and action the President could not alleviate duty with kindness.  To get information uncolored by passage through the minds of others, he went down to Harrison’s Landing on July 7, observed all that he could see, and talked matters over.  Prior to this visit it is supposed that he had leaned towards McClellan’s views, and had inclined to renew the advance.  Nor is it clearly apparent that he learned anything during this trip which induced him to change his mind.  Rather it seems probable that he maintained his original opinion until General Halleck had declared against