The fight at Williamsburg took place on May 5.  McClellan pushed after the retiring enemy, too slowly, as his detractors said, yet by roads which really were made almost impassable by heavy rains.  Two days later, May 7, Franklin’s force disembarked and occupied West Point.  This advance up the Peninsula now produced one important result which had been predicted by McClellan in his letter of February 3.  On May 8 news came that the Confederates were evacuating Norfolk, and two days later a Union force marched into the place.  The rebels lost many heavy guns, besides all the advantages of the navy yard with its workshops and stores; moreover, their awe-inspiring ram, the Merrimac, alias the Virginia, was obliged to leave this comfortable nestling-place, whence she had long watched and closed the entrance to the James River.  Her commander, Tatnall, would have taken her up that stream, but the pilots declared it not possible to float her over the shoals.  She was therefore abandoned and set on fire; and early in the morning of May 11 she blew up, leaving the southern water-way to Richmond open to the Union fleet.[13] It was a point of immense possible advantage.  Later McClellan intimated that, if he had been left free to act upon his own judgment, he would probably have availed himself of this route; and some writers, with predilections in his favor, have assumed that he was prevented from doing so by certain orders, soon to be mentioned, which directed him to keep the northerly route for the purpose of effecting a junction with McDowell.  But this notion seems incorrect; for though he doubtless had the James River route under consideration, yet dates are against the theory that he wished to adopt it when at last it lay open.  On the contrary, he continued his advance precisely as before.  On May 16 his leading columns reached White House; headquarters were established there, and steps were immediately taken to utilize it as a depot and base of supplies.  The York River route was thus made the definitive choice.  Also the advance divisions were immediately pushed out along the York River and Richmond Railroad, which they repaired as they went.  On May 20 Casey’s division actually crossed the Chickahominy at Bottom’s Bridge, and the next day a large part of the army was in position upon the north bank of that stream.  Obviously these operations, each and all, ruled out the James River route, at least as a part of the present plan.  Yet it was not until they were well under way, viz., on May 18, that the intelligence reached McClellan, on the strength of which he and others afterward assumed that he had been deprived of the power to select the James River route.  What this intelligence was and how it came to pass must now be narrated.