On April 9 Mr. Lincoln presented his own view of the situation in this letter to the general:—­

“Your dispatches complaining that you are not properly sustained, while they do not offend me, do pain me very much.

...  “After you left I ascertained that less than 20,000 unorganized men, without a single field battery, were all you designed to be left for the defense of Washington and Manassas Junction, and part of this even was to go to General Hooker’s old position.  General Banks’s corps, once designed for Manassas Junction, was diverted and tied up on the line of Winchester and Strasburg, and could not leave it without again exposing the upper Potomac and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.  This presented, or would present, when McDowell and Sumner should be gone, a great temptation to the enemy to turn back from the Rappahannock and sack Washington.  My implicit order that Washington should, by the judgment of all the commanders of army corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglected.  It was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell.

“I do not forget that I was satisfied with your arrangement to leave Banks at Manassas Junction; but when that arrangement was broken up, and nothing was substituted for it, of course I was constrained to substitute something for it myself.  And allow me to ask, do you really think I should permit the line from Richmond, via Manassas Junction, to this city, to be entirely open, except what resistance could be presented by less than 20,000 unorganized troops?  This is a question which the country will not allow me to evade.

“There is a curious mystery about the number of troops now with you.  When I telegraphed you on the 6th, saying you had over a hundred thousand with you, I had just obtained from the secretary of war a statement taken, as he said, from your own returns, making 108,000 then with you and en route to you.  You now say you will have but 85,000 when all en route to you shall have reached you.  How can the discrepancy of 23,000 be accounted for?

“As to General Wool’s command,[12] I understand it is doing for you precisely what a like number of your own would have to do if that command was away.

“I suppose the whole force which has gone forward for you is with you by this time.  And if so, I think it is the precise time for you to strike a blow.  By delay the enemy will relatively gain upon you,—­that is, he will gain faster by fortifications and reinforcements than you can by reinforcements alone.  And once more let me tell you, it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow.  I am powerless to help this.  You will do me the justice to remember I always insisted that going down the bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only shifting, and not surmounting, a difficulty; that we would find the same enemy, and the same or equal intrenchments, at either place.  The country will not fail to note, is now noting, that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated.