Of more consequence, however, than this useless letter was the news which Mr. Blair brought:  that other high officials in Richmond—­“those who follow,” as Mr. Lincoln had hopefully said—­were in a temper far more despondent and yielding than was that of their chief.  These men might be reached.  So on January 18, 1865, Mr. Lincoln wrote a few lines, also addressed to Mr. Blair, saying that he was ready to receive any Southern agent who should be informally sent to him, “with the view of securing peace to the people of our one common country.”  The two letters, by their closing words, locked horns.  Yet Mr. Davis nominated Alexander H. Stephens, R.M.T.  Hunter, and John A. Campbell, as informal commissioners, and directed them, “in conformity with the letter of Mr. Lincoln,” to go to Washington and informally confer “for the purpose of securing peace to the two countries.”  This was disingenuous, and so obviously so that it was also foolish; for no conference about “two countries” was “in conformity” with the letter of Mr. Lincoln.  By reason of the difficulty created by this silly trick the commissioners were delayed at General Grant’s headquarters until they succeeded in concocting a note, which eliminated the obstacle by the simple process of omitting the objectionable words.  Then, on January 31, the President sent Mr. Seward to meet them, stating to him in writing “that three things are indispensable, to wit:  1.  The restoration of the national authority throughout all the States. 2.  No receding by the executive of the United States on the slavery question from the position assumed thereon in the late annual message to Congress, and in preceding documents. 3.  No cessation of hostilities short of an end of the war and the disbanding of all forces hostile to the government.  You will inform them that all propositions of theirs, not inconsistent with the above, will be considered and passed upon in a spirit of sincere liberality.  You will hear all they may choose to say, and report it to me.  You will not assume to definitely consummate anything.”

The following day Mr. Lincoln seemed to become uneasy at being represented by any other person whomsoever in so important a business; for he decided to go himself and confer personally with the Southerners.  Then ensued, and continued during four hours, on board a steamer in Hampton Roads, the famous conference between the President and his secretary of state on the one side and the three Confederate commissioners on the other.  It came to absolutely nothing; nor was there at any time pending its continuance any chance that it would come to anything.  Mr. Lincoln could neither be led forward nor cajoled sideways, directly or indirectly, one step from the primal condition of the restoration of the Union.  On the other hand, this was the one impossible thing for the Confederates.  The occasion was historic, and yet, in fact, it amounted to nothing more than cumulative evidence of a familiar