that he needed, he was sustained by the good-will and confidence of a majority of the people, which lay as a solid substratum beneath all the disturbance on the surface.  It was well that this was so, for a war conducted by a cabinet or a congress could have ended only in disaster.  This peculiar character of the situation may not be readily admitted; it is often convenient to deny and ignore facts in order to assert popular theories; and that there was a real master in the United States is a proposition which many will consider it highly improper to make and very patriotic to contradict.  None the less, however, it is true, and by the autumn of 1863 every intelligent man in the country felt that it was true.  Moreover, it was because this was true, and because that master was immovably persistent in the purpose to conquer the South, that the conquest of the South could now be discerned as substantially a certainty in the future.

Some other points should also be briefly made here.  The war is to be divided into two stages.  The first two years were educational; subsequently the fruits of that education were attained.  The men who had studied war as a profession, but had had no practical experience, found much to learn in warfare as a reality after the struggle began.  But before the summer of 1863 there were in the service many generals, than whom none better could be desired.  “Public men” were somewhat slow in discovering that their capacity to do pretty much everything did not include the management of campaigns.  But by the summer of 1863 these “public” persons made less noise in the land than they had made in the days of McClellan; and though political considerations could never be wholly suppressed, the question of retaining or displacing a general no longer divided parties, or superseded, and threatened to wreck, the vital question of the war.  Moreover, as has been remarked in another connection, the nation began to appreciate that while war was a science so far as the handling of armies in the field was concerned, it was strictly a business in its other aspects.  By, and in fact before, the summer of 1863 this business had been learned and was being efficiently conducted.

Time and experience had done no less for the President than for others.  A careful daily student of the topography of disputed regions, of every proposed military movement, of every manoeuvre, every failure, every success, he was making himself a skillful judge in the questions of the campaigns.  He had also been studying military literature.  Yet as his knowledge and his judgment grew, his modesty and his abstention from interference likewise grew.  He was more and more chary of endeavoring to control his generals.  The days of such contention as had thwarted the plans of McClellan without causing other plans to be heartily and fully adopted had fortunately passed, never to return.  Of course, however, this was in part due to the fact that the war had now