towards the Gap seemed imprudent in face of Kentucky’s theory of “neutrality.”  But this foolish notion was in time effectually disposed of by the Confederates.  Unable to resist the temptation offered by the important position of Columbus at the western end of the State on the Mississippi River, they seized that place in September, 1861.  The state legislature, incensed at the intrusion, immediately embraced the Union cause and welcomed the Union forces within the state lines.

This action opened the way for the President to make strenuous efforts for the protection of the East Tennesseeans and the possession of the Gap.  In his annual message he urged upon Congress the construction of a military railroad to the Gap, and afterward appeared in person to advocate this measure before a committee of the Senate.  If the place had been in Virginia, he might have gained for his project an attention which, as matters stood, the politicians never accorded to it.  He also endeavored to stir to action General Buell, who commanded in Kentucky.  Buell, an appointee and personal friend of General McClellan, resembled his chief somewhat too closely both in character and history.  Just as Mr. Lincoln had to prick McClellan in Virginia, he now had to prick Buell in Kentucky; and just as McClellan, failed to respond in Virginia, Buell also failed in Kentucky.  Further, Buell, like McClellan, had with him a force very much greater than that before him; but Buell, like McClellan, would not admit that his troops were in condition to move.  The result was that Jefferson Davis, more active to protect a crucial point than the North was to assail it, in December, 1861, sent into East Tennessee a force which imprisoned, deported, and hanged the loyal residents there, harried the country without mercy, and held it with the iron hand.  The poor mountaineers, with good reason, concluded that the hostility of the South was a terribly serious evil, whereas the friendship of the North was a sadly useless good.  The President was bitterly chagrined, although certainly the blame did not rest with him.  Then the parallel between Buell and McClellan was continued even one step farther; for Buell at last intimated that he did not approve of the plan of campaign suggested for him, but thought it would be better tactics to move upon Nashville.  It so happened, however, that when he expressed these views McClellan was commander-in-chief of all the armies, and that general, being little tolerant of criticism from subordinates when he himself was the superior, responded very tartly and imperiously.  Lincoln, on the other hand, according to his wont, wrote modestly:  “Your dispatch ... disappoints and distresses me....  I am not competent to criticise your views.”  Then, in the rest of the letter, he maintained with convincing clearness both the military and the political soundness of his own opinions.