more valuable piece on the board than was her Southern rival.  With the Northern government in flight, Maryland would go to the Confederacy, and European recognition would be sure and immediate; and these two facts might, almost surely would, be conclusive against the Northern cause.  Moreover, memory will obstinately bring up the fact that long afterward, when General Grant was pursuing a route to Richmond strategically not dissimilar to that proposed by McClellan, and when all the circumstances made the danger of a successful attack upon Washington much less than it was in the spring of 1862, the rebels actually all but captured the city; and it was saved not alone by a rapidity of movement which would have been impossible in the early stages of the war, but also by what must be called the aid of good luck.  It is difficult to see why General Jackson in 1862 might not have played in fatal earnest a game which in 1864 General Early played merely for the chances.  Pondering upon these things, it is probable that no array of military scientists will ever persuade the non-military world that Mr. Lincoln was so timid, or so dull-witted, or so unreasonable, as General McClellan declared him to be.

Another consideration is suggested by some remarks of Mr. Swinton.  It is tolerably obvious that, whether McClellan’s plan was or was not the better, the President’s plan was entirely possible; all that could be said against it was that it promised somewhat poorer results at somewhat higher cost.  This being the case, and in view of the fact that the President’s disquietude concerning Washington was so profound and his distrust of McClellan’s plan so ineradicable, it would have been much better to have had the yielding come from the general than from the President.  A man of less stubborn temper and of broader intellect than belonged to McClellan would have appreciated this.  In fact, it was in a certain sense even poor generalship to enter upon a campaign of such magnitude, when a thorough and hearty cooeperation was really not to be expected.  For after all might be ostensibly settled and agreed upon, and however honest might be Mr. Lincoln’s intentions to support the commanding general, one thing still remained certain:  that the safety of the capital was Mr. Lincoln’s weightiest responsibility, that it was a matter concerning which he was sensitively anxious, and that he was perfectly sure in any moment of alarm concerning that safety to insure it by any means in his power and at any sacrifice whatsoever.  In a word, that which soon did happen was precisely that which ought to have been foreseen as likely to happen.  For it was entirely obvious that Mr. Lincoln did not abandon his own scheme because his own reason was convinced of the excellence of McClellan’s; in fact, he never was and never pretended to be thus convinced.  To his mind, McClellan’s reasoning never overcame his own reasoning; he only gave way before professional authority; and, while