the politicians.  In fact, he decided to go counter to both the disputants; for he resolved, on the one hand, to compel McClellan to act; on the other, to maintain him in his command.  He did not, however, abandon his own plan of campaign.  On January 27, as commander-in-chief of the army, he issued his “General War Order No. 1.”  In this he directed “that the 22d day of February, 1862, be the day for a general movement of the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces;” and said that heads of departments and military and naval commanders would “be held to their strict and full responsibilities for prompt execution of this order.”  By this he practically repudiated McClellan’s scheme, because transportation and other preparations for pursuing the route by Urbana could not be made ready by the date named.

Critics of the President have pointed to this document as a fine instance of the follies to be expected from a civil ruler who conducts a war.  To order an advance all along a line from the Mississippi to the Atlantic, upon a day certain, without regard to differing local conditions and exigencies, and to notify the enemy of the purpose nearly a month beforehand, were acts preposterous according to military science.  But the criticism was not so fair as it was obvious.  The order really bore in part the character of a manifesto; to the people of the North, whose confidence must be kept and their spirit sustained, it said that the administration meant action at once; to commanding officers it was a fillip, warning them to bestir themselves, obstacles to the contrary notwithstanding.  It was a reveille.  Further, in a general way it undoubtedly laid out a sound plan of campaign, substantially in accordance with that which McClellan also was evolving, viz.:  to press the enemy all along the western and middle line, and thus to prevent his making too formidable a concentration in Virginia.  In the end, however, practicable or impracticable, wise or foolish, the order was never fulfilled.  The armies in Virginia did nothing till many weeks after the anniversary of Washington’s birthday; whereas, in the West, Admiral Foote and General Grant did not conceive that they were enforced to rest in idleness until that historic date.  Before it arrived they had performed the brilliant exploits of capturing Fort Henry and Fort Donelson.

On January 31 the President issued “Special War Order No. 1,” directing the army of the Potomac to seize and occupy “a point upon the railroad southwestward of what is known as Manassas Junction;... the expedition to move before or on the 22d day of February next.”  This was the distinct, as the general order had been the indirect, adoption of his own plan of campaign, and the overruling of that of the general.  McClellan at once remonstrated, and the two rival plans thus came face to face for immediate and definitive settlement.  It must be assumed that the President’s order had been really designed only to force exactly this issue; for on February 3, so soon as he received the remonstrance, he invited argument from the general by writing to him a letter which foreshadowed an open-minded reception for views opposed to his own:—­