what he thought could be done, closing “by saying something apologetic;” to which McClellan replied, “somewhat coldly if not curtly:  ’You are entitled to have any opinion you please.’” Secretary Chase, a leader among the anti-McClellanites, bluntly asked the general to explain his military plans in detail; but McClellan declined to be interrogated except by the President, or by the secretary of war, who was not present.  Finally, according to McClellan’s account, which differs a little but not essentially from that of McDowell, Mr. Lincoln suggested[157] that he should tell what his plans were.  McClellan replied, in substance, that this would be imprudent and seemed unnecessary, and that he would only give information if the President would order him in writing to do so, and would assume the responsibility for the results.[158] McDowell adds (but McClellan does not), that the President then asked McClellan “if he had counted upon any particular time; he did not ask what that time was, but had he in his own mind any particular time fixed, when a movement could be commenced.  He replied, he had.  ‘Then,’ rejoined the President, ‘I will adjourn this meeting.’” This unfortunate episode aggravated the discord, and removed confidence and cooeperation farther away than ever before.

The absence of the secretary of war from these meetings was due to the fact that a change in the War Department was in process contemporaneously with them.  The President had been allowed to understand that Mr. Cameron did not find his duties agreeable, and might prefer a diplomatic post.  Accordingly, with no show of reluctance, Mr. Lincoln, on January 11, 1862, offered to Mr. Cameron the post of minister to Russia.  It was promptly accepted, and on January 13 Edwin M. Stanton was nominated and confirmed to fill the vacancy.[159] The selection was a striking instance of the utter absence of vindictiveness which so distinguished Mr. Lincoln, who, in fact, was simply insensible to personal feeling as an influence.  In choosing incumbents for public trusts, he knew no foe, perhaps no friend; but as dispassionately as if he were manoeuvring pieces on a chessboard, he considered only which available piece would serve best in the square which he had to fill.  In 1859 he and Stanton had met as associate counsel in perhaps the most important lawsuit in which Mr. Lincoln had ever been concerned, and Stanton had treated Lincoln with his habitual insolence.[160] Later, in the trying months which closed the year 1861, Stanton had abused the administration with violence, and had carried his revilings of the President even to the point of coarse personal insults.[161] No man, not being a rebel, had less right to expect an invitation to become an adviser of the President; and most men, who had felt or expressed the opinions held by Mr. Stanton, would have had scruples or delicacy about coming into the close relationship of confidential adviser with the object of their contempt; but neither scruples nor delicacy delayed him; his acceptance was prompt.[162]