That these statements were as favorable as possible seems probable; for it is familiar knowledge that the call for these troops did not issue until July, that at the close of November the recruits were still continuing “to pour in, to be assigned and equipped and instructed;"[148] that many came unarmed or with useless weapons; and that these “civilians, suddenly called to arms as soldiers and officers, did not take kindly to the subordination and restraints of the camp."[149] Now McClellan’s temperament did not lead him to run risks in the effort to force achievements with means of dubious adequacy.  His purpose was to create a machine perfect in every part, sure and irresistible in operation, and then to set it in motion with a certainty of success.  He wrote to Lincoln:  “I have ever regarded our true policy as being that of fully preparing ourselves, and then seeking for the most decisive results."[150] Under favoring circumstances this plan might have been the best.  But circumstances were not favoring.  Neither he nor the government itself, nor indeed both together, could afford long or far to disregard popular feeling.  Before the close of November that popular feeling was such that the people would have endured without flinching the discouragement of a defeat, but would not endure the severe tax of inaction, and from this time forth their impatience gathered volume until it became a controlling element in the situation.  Themselves intending to be reasonable, they grew more and more convinced that McClellan was unreasonable.  General and people confronted each other:  the North would fight, at the risk of defeat; McClellan would not fight, because he was not sure to win.  Any one who comprehended the conditions, the institutions of the country, the character of the nation, especially its temper concerning the present conflict, also the necessities beneath which that conflict must be waged, if it was to be waged at all, would have seen that the people must be deferred to.  The question was not whether they were right or wrong.  Assuming them to be wrong, it would still be a mistake to withstand them beyond a certain point.  If yielding to them should result in disastrous consequences, they must be called upon to rally, and could be trusted to do so, instructed but undismayed by their experience.  All this McClellan utterly failed to appreciate, thereby leading Mr. Swinton very justly to remark that he was lacking in “the statesmanlike qualities that enter into the composition of a great general."[151]

On the other hand, no man ever lived more capable than Mr. Lincoln of precisely appreciating the present facts, or more sure to avoid those peculiar blunders which entrapped the military commander.  He was very loyal in living up to his pledge to give the general full support, and by his conduct during many months to come he proved his readiness to abide to the last possible point.  He knew, however, with unerring accuracy just where that last point lay,