choose, at the conclusion that whatever must be done might be done.  These learned gentlemen did their duty, and developed the “war powers” under the Constitution in a manner equally ingenious, comical, and sensible.  But the fundamental basis was, that necessity knows no law; every man in the country knew this, but the well-intentioned denied it, as matter of policy, while the ill-intentioned made such use of the opportunities thus afforded to them as might have been expected.  Among the “war Democrats,” however, there was at least ostensible liberality.

An early question related to the writ of habeas corpus.  The Maryland legislature was to meet on April 26, 1861, and was expected to guide the State in the direction of secession.  Many influential men urged the President to arrest the members before they could do this.  He, however, conceived such an interference with a state government, in the present condition of popular feeling, to be impolitic.  “We cannot know in advance,” he said, “that the action will not be lawful and peaceful;” and he instructed General Scott to watch them, and, in case they should make a movement towards arraying the people against the United States, to counteract it by “the bombardment of their cities, and, in the extremest necessity, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.”  This intimation that the suspension of the venerated writ was a measure graver than even bombarding a city, surely indicated sufficient respect for laws and statutes.  The legislators restrained their rebellious ardor and proved the wisdom of Mr. Lincoln’s moderation.  In the autumn, however, the crisis recurred, and then the arrests seemed the only means of preventing the passage of an ordinance of secession.  Accordingly the order was issued and executed.  Public opinion upheld it, and Governor Hicks afterward declared his belief that only by this action had Maryland been saved from destruction.

The privilege of habeas corpus could obviously, however, be made dangerously serviceable to disaffected citizens.  Therefore, April 27, the President instructed General Scott:  “If at any point on or in the vicinity of any military line which is now, or which shall be, used between the city of Philadelphia and the city of Washington, you find it necessary to suspend the writ of habeas corpus for the public safety, you ... are authorized to suspend that writ.”  Several weeks elapsed before action was taken under this authority.  Then, on May 25, John Merryman, recruiting in Maryland for the Confederate service, was seized and imprisoned in Fort McHenry.  Chief Justice Taney granted a writ of habeas corpus.  General Cadwalader replied that he held Merryman upon a charge of treason, and that he had authority under the President’s letter to suspend the writ.  The chief justice thereupon issued against the general an attachment for contempt, but the marshal was refused admittance to the fort.  The chief justice then filed with the clerk, and also sent to the President, his written