as much on every subject whatsoever as is known by any other living man, produced its full results during the war.  Every clergyman and humanitarian, every village politician and every city wire-puller, every one who conned the maps of Virginia and imbibed the military wisdom of the newspapers, every merchant who put his name to a subscription paper, considered it his privilege and his duty to set the President right upon every question of moral principle, of politics, of strategy, and of finance.  In one point of view it was not flattering that he should seem to stand in need of so much instruction; and this was equally true whether it came bitterly, as criticism from enemies, or sugar-coated, as advice from friends.  That friends felt obliged to advise so much was in itself a criticism.  Probably, however, Mr. Lincoln was not troubled by this view, for he keenly appreciated the idiosyncrasies as well as the better qualities of the people.  They, however, were a long while in understanding him sufficiently to recognize that there was never a man whom it was less worth while to advise.

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Business crowded upon Mr. Lincoln, and the variety and novelty of it was without limit.  On April 17 Jefferson Davis issued a proclamation offering “letters of marque and reprisal” to owners of private armed vessels.  Two days later the President retorted by proclaiming a blockade of Confederate ports.[144] Of course this could not be made effective upon the moment.  On March 4 the nominal total of vessels in the navy was 90.  Of these, 69 were classed as “available;” but only 42 were actually in commission; and even of these many were in Southern harbors, and fell into the hands of the Confederates; many more were upon foreign and distant stations.  Indeed, the dispersion was so great that it was commonly charged as having been intentionally arranged by secessionist officials under Mr. Buchanan.  Also, at the very moment when this proclamation was being read throughout the country, the great navy yard of Gosport, at Norfolk, Virginia, “always the favored depot” of the government, with all its workshops and a great store of cannon and other munitions, was passing into the hands of the enemy.  Most of the vessels and some other property were destroyed by Federals before the seizure was consummated; nevertheless, the loss was severe.  Moreover, even had all the vessels of the regular navy been present, they would have had other duties besides lying off Southern ports.  Blockading squadrons, therefore, had to be improvised, and orders at once issued for the purchase and equipment of steam vessels from the merchant marine and the coasting service.  Fortunately the summer season was at hand, so that these makeshifts were serviceable for many months, during which better craft were rapidly got together by alteration and building.  Three thousand miles of coast and many harbors were included within the blockade limits, and were distributed into