Meantime three transports of the relief expedition were lying outside the bar.  The first arrived shortly before the bombardment began, the other two came only a trifle later.  All day long these vessels lay to, wondering why the Powhatan did not appear.  Had she been there upon the critical night of the 12th, the needed supplies could have been thrown into the fort, for the weather was so dark that the rebel patrol was useless, and it was actually believed in Charleston that the relief had been accomplished.  But the Powhatan was far away steaming at full speed for Pensacola.  For this sad blunder Lincoln generously, but fairly enough, took the blame to himself.  The only excuse which has ever been advanced in behalf of Mr. Lincoln is that he allowed himself to be led blindfold through this important business by Mr. Seward, and that he signed such papers as the secretary of state presented to him without learning their purport and bearing.  But such an excuse, even if it can be believed, seems fully as bad as the blunder which it is designed to palliate.

Other blame also has been laid upon Lincoln on the ground that he was dilatory in reaching the determination to relieve the fort.  That the decision should have been reached and the expedition dispatched more promptly is entirely evident; but whether or not Lincoln was in fault is quite another question.  Three facts are to be considered:  1.  The highest military authority in the country advised him, a civilian, that evacuation was a necessity. 2.  Most of his ministers were at first against reinforcement, and they never unanimously recommended it; especially his secretary of state condemned it as bad policy. 3.  The almost universal feeling of the people of the North, so far as it could then be divined, was compromising, conciliatory, and thoroughly opposed to any act of war.  Under such circumstances it was rather an exhibition of independence and courage that Lincoln reached the conclusion of relieving the fort at all, than it was a cause of fault-finding that he did not come to the conclusion sooner.  He could not know in March how the people were going to feel after the 13th of April; in fact, if they had fancied that he was provoking hostilities, their feeling might not even then have developed as it did.  Finally, he gained his point in forcing the Confederacy into the position of assailant, and there is every reason to believe that he bought that point cheaply at the price of the fortress.

The news of the capture of Sumter had an instant and tremendous effect.  The States which had seceded were thrown into a pleasurable ferment of triumph; the Northern States arose in fierce wrath; the Middle States, still balancing dubiously between the two parties, were rent with passionate discussion.  For the moment the North seemed a unit; there had been Southern sympathizers before, and Southern sympathizers appeared in considerable numbers later, but for a little while just now they were very scarce.