The form of this question indicated that Lincoln contemplated a possibility of being compelled to recede from the policy expressed in his inaugural.  Yet it was not his temperament to abandon a purpose deliberately matured and definitely announced, except under absolute necessity.  To determine now this question of necessity he sent an emissary to Sumter and another to Charleston, and meantime stayed offensive action on the part of the Confederates by authorizing Seward to give assurance through Judge Campbell that no provisioning or reinforcement should be attempted without warning.  Thus he secured, or continued, a sort of truce, irregular and informal, but practical.  Meantime he was encouraged by the earnest propositions of Mr. G.V.  Fox, until lately an officer of the navy, who was ready to undertake the relief of the fort.  Eager discussions ensued, wherein naval men backed the project of Mr. Fox, and army men condemned it.  Such difference of expert opinion was trying, for the problem was of a kind which Mr. Lincoln’s previous experience in life did not make it easy for him to solve with any confidence in the correctness of his own judgment.

Amid this puzzlement day after day glided by, and the question remained unsettled.  Yet during this lapse of time sentiment was ripening, and perhaps this was the real purpose of Lincoln’s patient waiting.  On March 29 his ministers again put their opinions in writing, and now Chase, Welles, and Blair favored an effort at reinforcement; Bates modified his previous opposition so far as to say that the time had come either to evacuate or relieve the fort; Smith favored evacuation, but only on the ground of military necessity; and Seward alone advocated evacuation in part on the ground of policy; he deemed it unwise to “provoke a civil war,” especially “in rescue of an untenable position.”

Was it courtesy or curiosity that induced the President to sit and listen to this warm debate between his chosen advisers?  They would have been angry had they known that they were bringing their counsel to a chief who had already made his decision.  They did not yet know that upon every occasion of great importance Lincoln would make up his mind for and by himself, yet would not announce his decision, or save his counselors the trouble of counseling, until such time as he should see fit to act.  So in this instance he had already, the day before the meeting of the cabinet, directed Fox to draw up an order for such ships, men, and supplies as he would require, and when the meeting broke up he at once issued formal orders to the secretaries of the navy and of war to enter upon the necessary preparation.