him and the South Carolinians.  It was distinctly understood that, sooner or later, by negotiation or by force, South Carolina intended to possess herself of this fortress.  From her point of view it certainly was preposterous and unendurable that the key to her chief harbor and city should be permanently held by a “foreign” power.  Gradually she erected batteries on the neighboring mainland, and kept a close surveillance upon the troops now more than half besieged in the fort.

Under the Buchanan regime the purpose of the United States government had been less plain than it became after Mr. Lincoln’s accession; for Buchanan had not the courage either to order a surrender, or to provoke real warfare by reinforcing the place.  In vain did the unfortunate Major Anderson seek distinct instructions; the replies which he received were contradictory and more obscure than Delphic oracles.  This unfair, vacillating, and contemptible conduct indicated the desire to lay upon him alone the whole responsibility of the situation, with a politic and selfish reservation to the government of the advantage of disavowing and discrediting him, whatever he might do.  On January 9 a futile effort at communication was made by the steamer Star of the West; it failed, and left matters worse rather than better.  On March 3, 1861, the Confederate government put General Beauregard in command at Charleston, thereby emphasizing the resolution to have Sumter ere long.  Such was the situation on March 4, when Mr. Lincoln came into control and declared a policy which bound him to “hold, occupy, and possess” Sumter.  On the same day there came a letter from Major Anderson, describing his position.  There were shut up in the fort together a certain number of men and a certain quantity of biscuit and of pork; when the men should have eaten the biscuit and the pork, which they would probably do in about four weeks, they would have to go away.  The problem thus became direct, simple, and urgent.

Lincoln sought an opinion from Scott, and was told that “evacuation seems almost inevitable.”  He requested a more thorough investigation, and a reply to specific questions:  “To what point of time can Anderson maintain his position in Sumter?  Can you, with present means, relieve him in that time?  What additional means would enable you to do so?” The general answered that four months would be necessary to prepare the naval force, and an even longer time to get together the 5000 regular troops and 20,000 volunteers that would be needed, to say nothing of obtaining proper legislation from Congress.  Equally discouraging were the opinions of the cabinet officers.  On March 15 Lincoln put to them the question:  “Assuming it to be possible to now provision Fort Sumter, under all the circumstances is it wise to attempt it?” Only Chase and Blair replied that it would be wise; Seward, Cameron, Wells, Smith, and Bates were against it.