but he was perfectly clear that “the right of a State to secede is not an open or debatable question.”  He desired that General Scott should be prepared either to “hold or retake” the Southern forts, if need should be, at or after the inauguration; but on his journey to Washington he said to many audiences that he wished no war and no bloodshed, and that these evils could be avoided if people would only “keep cool” and “keep their temper, on both sides of the line.”

On Monday, February 11, 1861, Mr. Lincoln spoke to his fellow citizens of Springfield a very brief farewell, so solemn as to sound ominous in the ears of those who know what afterward occurred.  It was arranged that he should stop at various points upon the somewhat circuitous route which had been laid out, and that he should arrive in Washington on Saturday, February 23.  The programme, was pursued accurately till near the close; he made, of course, many speeches, but none added anything to what was already known as to his views.

Meantime the thick rumors of violence were bringing much uneasiness to persons who were under responsibilities.  Baltimore was the place where, and its villainous “Plug Uglies” were the persons by whom, the plot, if there was one, was to be executed.  Mr. Felton, president of the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad Company, engaged Allan Pinkerton to explore the matter, and the report of this skillful detective indicated a probability of an attack with the purpose of assassination.  At that time the cars were drawn by horses across town from the northern to the southern station, and during the passage an assault could be made with ease and with great chance of success.  As yet there was no indication that the authorities intended to make, even if they could make,[124] any adequate arrangements for the protection of the traveler.  At Philadelphia Mr. Lincoln was told of the fears of his friends, and talked with Mr. Pinkerton, but he refused to change his plan.  On February 22 he was to assist at a flag-raising in Philadelphia, and was then to go on to Harrisburg, and on the following day he was to go from there to Baltimore.  He declined to alter either route or hours.

But other persons besides Mr. Felton had been busy with independent detective investigations, the result of which was in full accord with the report of Mr. Pinkerton.  On February 22 Mr. Frederick W. Seward, sent by his father and General Scott, both then at Washington, delivered to Mr. Lincoln, at Philadelphia, the message that there was “serious danger” to his life if the time of his passage through Baltimore should be known.  Yet Lincoln still remained obdurate.  He declared that if an escorting delegation from Baltimore should meet him at Harrisburg, he would go on with it.  But at Harrisburg no such escort presented itself.  Then the few who knew the situation discussed further as to what should be done, Norman B. Judd being chief spokesman for evading the danger by a