The enemy at this time were at least twenty miles in advance of their supports, and a night’s march would have readily placed the several forces mentioned in position to attack them by daylight.  This was Wallace’s plan,—­simple, feasible, and soldier-like.  All his orders were given.  A supply-train with extra ammunition and abundant rations was in line on the road to Richmond.  Clay’s brigade was drawn up ready to move, and General Wallace’s horse was saddled.  He was writing a last order in reference to the city of Lexington in his absence, and directing the officer left in charge to forward regiments to him at Richmond as fast as they should arrive, when General Nelson came and instantly took the command.  Fifteen minutes more and General Wallace would have been on the road to Richmond to superintend the execution of his plan of attack.  The supersession was, of course, a bitter disappointment; yet he never grumbled or demurred in the least, but, like a true soldier who knows his duty, offered that evening to serve his successor in any capacity, a generosity which General Nelson declined.  The well-conceived plan which Wallace had matured failed for the simple reason, that, instead of marching to execute it that night, as common sense would seem to have dictated, Nelson did not leave Lexington until the next day at one o’clock; and at daylight, when the attack was to have been made, the Rebel leader, Scott, discovered his danger, and wisely retreated, finding nobody in his rear.  The result was, Nelson went to Richmond and was defeated.  It is possible that the same result might have followed Wallace; but by those competent to judge it is thought otherwise.

He had a plan adapted to the troops he was leading, who, although very raw, would have been invincible behind breastworks, as American troops have always shown themselves to be.  Wallace never intended arraying these inexperienced men in the open field against the veteran troops of the Rebels.  Neither did he intend they should dig.  He had collected large quantities of intrenching tools, and was rapidly assembling a corps of negroes, nearly five hundred of whom he had already in waiting in Morgan’s factory, all prepared to follow his column, armed with spades and picks.  In Madison County he intended getting at least five hundred more.  “I will march,” he said, “like Caesar in Gaul, and intrench my camp every night.  If I am attacked at any time in too great numbers, I can drop back to my nearest works, and wait for reinforcements.”  Such was his plan, and those who know him believe firmly that he could have been at the Cumberland Gap in time not only to succor our little army there, but to have prevented the destruction and evacuation of that very important post.