“Political men,” he says,

“believed nothing could be done at sea but to lose the few vessels which we had; that even cruising was out of the question.  Of our seventeen vessels, the whole were in port but one; and it was determined to keep them there, and the one at sea with them, if it had the luck to get in.  I am under no obligation to make the admission, but I am free to acknowledge that I was one of those who supposed that there was no salvation for our seventeen men-of-war but to run them as far up the creek as possible, place them under the guns of batteries, and collect camps of militia about them to keep off the British.  This was the policy at the day of the declaration of the war; and I have the less concern to admit myself to have been participator in the delusion, because I claim the merit of having profited from experience,—­happy if I could transmit the lesson to posterity.  Two officers came to Washington,—­Bainbridge and Stewart.  They spoke with Mr. Madison, and urged the feasibility of cruising.  One half of the whole number of the British men-of-war were under the class of frigates, consequently no more than matches for some of our seventeen; the whole of her merchant marine (many thousands) were subject to capture.  Here was a rich field for cruising; and the two officers, for themselves and brothers, boldly proposed to enter it.

“Mr. Madison had seen the efficiency of cruising and privateering, even against Great Britain, and in our then infantile condition, during the war of the Revolution; and besides was a man of sense, and amenable to judgment and reason.  He listened to the two experienced and valiant officers; and without consulting Congress, which perhaps would have been a fatal consultation (for multitude of counsellors is not the counsel for bold decision), reversed the policy which had been resolved upon; and, in his supreme character of constitutional commander of the army and navy, ordered every ship that could cruise to get to sea as soon as possible.  This I had from Mr. Monroe.”

This is a curious example of the blinding effect of partisan strife, and of the absolute need of an Opposition.  It was the hereditary prejudice of the Republicans against the navy, as an “aristocratic” institution, and the hereditary love of the navy cherished by the Federalists as being something stable and British, that enlivened the debates of the war.  The Federalists had their way, but failed to win a partisan advantage from the fact, through their factious opposition to the military measures of the administration.  Because the first attempt at the seizure of Canada had failed through the incompetency of General Hull, which no wisdom of man could have foreseen, Daniel Webster called upon the government to discontinue all further attempts on the land, and fight the war out on the sea.  “Give up your futile projects of invasion,” said he in 1814.