States, because he believed its power and influence were to be used in favor of Mr. Clay’s elevation to the Presidency.  He took care, in his Message vetoing the recharter of the Bank, to employ some of the arguments which Clay had used in opposing the recharter of the United States Bank in 1811.  Miserably sick and infirm as he was, he consented to stand for reelection, because there was no other candidate strong enough to defeat Henry Clay; and he employed all his art, and the whole power of the administration, during his second term, to smooth Mr. Van Buren’s path to the Presidency, to the exclusion of Henry Clay.  Plans were formed, too, and engagements made, the grand object of which was to keep Clay from the Presidency, even after Mr. Van Buren should have served his anticipated eight years.  General Jackson left Washington in 1837, expecting that Martin Van Buren would be President until 1845, and that he would then be succeeded by Thomas H. Benton.  Nothing prevented the fulfilment of this programme but the financial collapse of 1837, the effects of which continued during the whole of Mr. Van Buren’s term, and caused his defeat in 1840.

Mr. Clay accepted the defiance implied in General Jackson’s conduct.  He reappeared in Washington in 1831, in the character of Senator and candidate for the Presidency.  His journey to Washington was again a triumphal progress, and again the galleries were crowded to hear him speak.  A great and brilliant party gathered round him, strong in talents, character, property, and supposed to be strong in numbers.  He at once proved himself to be a most unskilful party leader.  Every movement of his in that character was a mistake.  He was precipitate when he ought to have been cautious, and cautious when nothing but audacity could have availed.  The first subject upon which he was called upon to act was the tariff.  The national debt being within two or three years of liquidation, Calhoun threatening nullification, and Jackson vetoing all internal improvement bills, it was necessary to provide against an enormous surplus.  Clay maintained that the protective duties should remain intact, and that only those duties should be reduced which protected no American interest.  This was done; the revenue was reduced three millions; and the surplus was as threatening as before.  It was impossible to save the protective duties entire without raising too much revenue.  Mr. Clay, as it seems to us, should have plainly said this to the manufacturers, and compelled his party in Congress to warn and save them by making a judicious cut at the protective duties in 1832.  This would have deprived Calhoun of his pretext, and prepared the way for a safe and gradual reduction of duties in the years following.  Such was the prosperity of the country in 1832, that the three millions lost to the revenue by Mr. Clay’s bill were likely to be made up to it in three years by the mere increase in the imports and land sales.