Another unfortunate statement with regard to induction and deduction is that the former “proceeds from particulars to generals” and the latter from “generals to particulars.”  Both of these statements omit the starting point and leave the thinker with no ground for either the particulars or the generals with which he works.  The thinker is supposed, let us say, to collect specimens of flowers in order to arrive at a notion of the characteristics of a certain class—­but why collect these rather than any others?  True, in the artificial situation of a schoolroom or college, the learner often collects in a certain field rather than another, simply because he is told to.  But in daily life he would not be told to—–­the incentive must come from some particular situation which presents a problem and therefore limits the field of search.  The starting point must be a particular experience or situation.  The same thing is true in deduction, although the syllogistic form has often been misleading.  “Metals are hard; iron is a metal, therefore iron is hard.”  But why talk about metals at all—­and if so why hardness rather than color or effect on bases or some other characteristic?  Of course, here again it is some particular problem that defines the search for the general and directs attention to some class characteristics rather than to others.  Not only is the starting point of all reasoning some definite situation for which there is no adequate response, but the end point must naturally be the same.  A particular problem demanding solution is the cause for reasoning, and, of course, the end of the process must be the solution of that problem.

From the foregoing it must not be concluded that the processes of induction and deduction are manifested only in connection with reasoning.  In fact, their use as a conscious tool of technique in reasoning comes only after considerable experience of their use when there was no conscious purpose and no control.  A little child’s notion of dog, or tree, or city—­in fact, all his psychological concepts necessitate the inductive movement, but it has taken place in his spontaneous thinking and the meanings have evolved after considerable experience without any definite control on his part.  So with deduction.  As he recognizes this as a chestnut tree, that as a rocking chair, as he decides that this is wrong or that it is going to clear, he is classifying things, or conduct, or conditions, and so is following the deductive movement.  But the judgments may come as a result of past experience, may be spontaneous and involve no protracted controlled activity which has been defined as thinking.  Man’s mind works spontaneously both inductively and deductively, and hence the possibility of control of these operations later.  Thinking is an outgrowth of spontaneous activity; reasoning is but an application of the natural laws of mental activity to certain situations.