Images may be classified according to the sense through which the original experience came, into visual, auditory, gustatory, tactile, kinaesthetic, and so on.  In many discussions of imagery the term “picture” has been used to describe it, and hence in the thought of many it is limited rather definitely to the visual field.  Of course this is entirely wrong.  The recall of a melody, or of the touch of velvet, or of the fragrance of a rose, is just as much mental imagery as the recall of the sight of a friend.

Three points of dispute in connection with image types are worth while noting.  First, the question is raised by some psychologists as to whether kinaesthetic or motor images really exist.  An example of such an image would be to imagine yourself as dancing, or walking downstairs, or writing your name, or saying the word “bubble.”  Those who object to such an image type claim that when one tries to get such an image, the attempt initiates slight muscle movements and the result is a sense experience instead of an imaged one.  They believe this always happens and that therefore a motor image is an impossibility.  Others agree that this reinstatement of actual movements often happens, but contend that in such cases the image precedes the movement and that the resulting movement does not always take place.  The question is still in dispute.

The second question in dispute is as to the possibility of classifying people according to the predominant type of their imagery.  People used to be classed as “visualizers,” “audiles.” etc., the supposition being that their mental imagery was predominantly in terms of vision or hearing.  This is being seriously questioned, and experimental work seems to show that such a classification, at least with the majority of people, is impossible.  The results which are believed to warrant such a conclusion are as follows:  First, no one has ever been tested who always used one type of image.  Second, the type of image used changed with the following factors:  the material, the purpose of the subject, the familiarity of the subject with the experience imagined.  For example, the same person would, perhaps, visualize if he were imaging landscape, but get an auditory image of a friend’s voice instead of a visual image of him.  He might, when under experimental conditions with the controlling purpose,—­that of examining his images,—­get visual images, but, when under ordinary conditions, get a larger number of auditory and kinaesthetic images.  He might when thought was flowing smoothly be using auditory and motor images, but upon the appearance of some obstacle or difficulty in the process find himself flooded with visual images.  Third, subjects who ranked high in one type of imagery ranked high in others, and subjects who ranked low in one type ranked low also in others.  The ability seems to be that of getting clear image types, or the lack of it, rather than the ability to get one type.  Fourth, most